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ABSTRACT 
 
 Exploring the application of the construction of canons to mineral 
conveyances, this Article focuses on how courts interpret the definition of 
“minerals” in seven oil and gas producing states.  Unlike a concrete rule of 
law or statute, a “canon” arises at a distinct stage in the decision making 
process:  to resolve irreconcilable ambiguities in the words of a contract, 
and the intent of those words.  While some similarities in these 
interpretations exist among courts, often jurisdictions take distinct views on 
the interpretation of mineral conveyances, severances, exceptions, and 
reservations.  In Part II, this Article provides a framework for understanding 
canons and Part III explains specific canons frequently utilized when 
referencing “minerals.”  These canons are then analyzed with respect to 
each of the seven states discussed in Part IV’s survey.  Finally, Part V 
provides recommendations and conclusions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores application of construction canons to mineral 
conveyance instruments, focusing on the judicial interpretation of 
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“minerals” in nine oil and gas producing states.1  A canon of construction is 
a metaphorical tool in the judicial belt that courts may utilize to ascertain a 
written agreement’s legal effect.2  Canons are not “rules of law”3 that 
demand strict adherence to yield a calculated result.  Rather, when properly 
applied by the courts, canons arise at a distinct stage in the decision making 
process:  to resolve irreconcilable ambiguities in the words of a contract, 
once the actual intent of the parties thereto proves indecipherable.4  In some 
states, an interpretation of a term or phrase by consistent application of 
particular canons may acquire authoritative weight so that its construction 
develops into a bright-line rule of property law.5  Much more common, 
however, are instances in which the same words garner various 
constructions within and across jurisdictions.6  As the impetus for given 
interpretation is not always clear, this variety generally stems from relevant 
circumstances making one canon more persuasive than another in achieving 
an equitable status among competing policy aims.  Unfortunately, this has 
contributed to a patchwork of interpretive guideposts for future courts and 
offers little practical direction for title examiners, attorneys, and industry 
players assessing the risks of mineral investment. 
This Article highlights a number of key procedural and policy concerns 
that arise when courts have applied canons to construe the precise 
ownership interest conveyed by a grant or reservation of “minerals.”  Part II 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding canons, focusing on 
procedural aspects such as intent, ambiguity, and extrinsic evidence.  Part II 
also introduces specific canons frequently utilized to construe unclear 
transfers of “minerals;” these canons will then be analyzed with respect to 
each of the nine states surveyed within Part IV. 
 
1. Part IV surveys this in Colorado, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia. 
2. See 6A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 899(3) (“Canons of construction are merely 
statements of judicial preference for the resolution of a particular problem.  They are based on 
common human experience and are designed to achieve what the court believes to be the ‘normal’ 
result for the problem under consideration.”). 
3. See Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don’t Mix:  The Mangling of Common 
Law Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 565 (1994) (“Courts may or may not use canons 
to assist them in interpreting a document and they may choose from a host of canons, some of 
which may be inconsistent.”). 
4. See POWELL, supra note 2, § 899(3) (“Thus, their purpose is not to ascertain the intent of 
the parties to the transaction.  Rather, it is to resolve a dispute when it is otherwise impossible to 
ascertain parties’ intent.”). 
5. For example, in Pennsylvania, the Dunham Rule – a well settled rule of property that a 
reservation of “minerals” does not include oil and gas – developed out of the application of the 
community knowledge test.  See infra Part IV.F. 
6. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and 
Leases:  An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1993). 
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II. INTERPRETIVE PROCESS:  CANONS’ POSITION ON THE 
JUDICIAL DECISION SPECTRUM 
The most common disputes over canons center on the proper time and 
significance with which they should be applied.  As Part II will discuss, the 
court’s goal of effectuating the intent of the contracting to include in the 
word “minerals,” introduces additional procedural concerns regarding 
extrinsic evidence and its proper role in aiding interpretation.  Part II 
concludes with a discussion of underlying policy aims that frame this 
procedural debate, and which courts must balance in applying canons to 
mineral conveyance instruments. 
A. A QUEST FOR CLEAR INTENT 
Courts today uniformly follow a golden rule of contract interpretation:  
a court will construe a written instrument to give effect to the clear intent 
expressed by the parties when they entered the contract.7  This intent 
becomes a unique creation of law and policy by which the so-called 
“parties’ intent” becomes the “judicially-ascertained” intent.  In 
determining the intent of the parties, the court considers such to the extent it 
comports with the meaning that the parties’ words or dealings convey.8 
A number of the concerns arising from canons applied at varying 
stages of interpretation come to fruition in the courts’ construction of a 
conveyance or reservation of “minerals.”  As both a cause and effect 
thereof, litigation to determine the scope and legal effect of a mineral grant 
or reservation based on generalized descriptions such as “all minerals” or 
“[specified substances] and other minerals” has reached the highest court of 
most states.9  The consequences of the courts’ construction as to what 
substances are included by this general language are paramount.10  Perhaps 
due to the high stakes of this “mineral” definition, coupled with the absence 
of a uniform common law definition of this term, these cases frequently 
cause courts to confound basic notions of intent, sacrificing common sense 
interpretation.11 
 
7. See, e.g., Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963). 
8. See David E. Pierce, Interpreting Oil and Gas Instruments, 1 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY 
L. 1, 3 (2006). 
9. See infra Part IV for a state survey; see also 1-2 WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 
§ 219, at 258-59 (1997) (“The problem most frequently litigated is whether oil and gas are 
included in a grant or reservation of ‘minerals.’”). 
10. The canons, if any, the court applies may result not only in substantial business and 
litigation expenses, but in some circumstances may wholly extinguish the purported rights of a 
party to the transaction. 
11. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 4-6. 
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An important issue to consider in assessing the court’s determination of 
intent at trial is jurisdiction:  who is the proper arbiter of these disputes?  
Regrettably, this issue is often overlooked:  “It is remarkable that, 
considering the number of cases in which the question of whether a 
particular substance is a mineral arises, courts have infrequently addressed 
whether the question is one of law or of fact.”12  A number of states have 
held that particular aspects of a mineral grant construction are decided as a 
matter of law, while some have labeled this a determination of fact.13  To be 
sure, this initial procedural issue of law or fact is not always outcome-
determinative;14 however, the distinction merits attention in cases where it 
leads the court to consider evidence beyond the instrument itself at the risk 
of substantially undermining one party’s claimed rights under the written 
agreement.15 
Additionally, the intent analysis, for courts which have not adopted 
bright-line rules, should be objective in nature.  While the court seeks the 
“actual” intent of the original parties, it should first limit its search for that 
intent to consideration of the written language of the deed.16  As discussed 
above, contract interpretation calls for the court to give the meaning to an 
instrument as intended by the parties thereto.  As a general rule, the court 
presumes “that the parties intended the language to have its ordinary and 
accepted meaning, unless there is clear expression of intent that the 
language was used in a different sense.”17  For example, a provision 
 
12. See, e.g., George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word ‘Minerals,’ 54 N.D. L. REV. 419, 
441 (1978). 
13. Compare Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 548 (N.D. 1973) (finding lignite 
included in “minerals” conveyed as a matter of law); Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petrol. 
Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. 1964) (holding the words “minerals” to include oil and gas as a 
matter of law), with Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1962); 
Brizzolara v. Powell, 218 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ark. 1949) (describing inclusion of substance general 
“mineral” grant as a matter of fact). 
14. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 442 (“It is probably more correct to say that it is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  In any event, it is a question to be decided in light of the purpose of the 
instrument, the circumstances of the particular case, and the context in which the words of grant or 
reservation are used.”).  But see McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 355-54 (Colo. 
2000) (holding that as a matter of law a reservation of “other minerals” reserves oil and gas and 
that no extrinsic evidence will be admitted to vary that conclusion). 
15. See, e.g., Lee v. Frank, 313 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1981) (“Although ordinarily the 
construction of a written contract to determine its legal effect is a question of law for the court to 
decide, . . . the interpretation of the parties’ intentions as to the meaning of certain words or 
phrases in a written contract may involve either a question of law or a question of fact depending 
on whether or not the interpretation requires the use of extrinsic evidence.  If the parties’ 
intentions in a written contract can be ascertained from the writing alone, then the interpretation of 
the contract is a question of law for the court to decide.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
16. See Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996) (“The intent of the 
parties is presumed to reside in the language they chose to use in their agreement.”). 
17. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 454. 
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granting or reserving “all minerals” creates a general presumption that all 
substances the court finds “legally cognizable as minerals” are included.18  
While this places the burden of supporting a more limited construction on 
the party seeking that limitation,19 it is ultimately up to the court to decide 
what this “legally cognizable” category included at the time of 
conveyance.20 
B. AMBIGUITY AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
The realm of judicial decision making, which deservedly brings the 
most criticism to the use of canons, is their obfuscation of basic principles 
concerning the admissibility of extrinsic evidence at trial.21  When a court 
looks to a deed to ascertain the intent of the parties, as has already been 
noted, it should first seek an objective and unambiguous expression shown 
in the language of the instrument.22  As a general rule, the court’s finding 
that the intent is clear and that the language creates no ambiguity requires 
the court to refrain from construction or consideration of extrinsic 
evidence.23  On the other hand, the court’s determination that deed language 
is ambiguous opens the door for each party to introduce extrinsic evidence 
to “prove” that its interpretation was the one shared by the parties at 
contracting.24  In sum, longstanding procedural rules have consistently 
placed a judicial finding of facial ambiguity as a condition precedent to the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in contract disputes. 
 
18. See MacMasters v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1957) (“No word is more inclusive 
than ‘all’ and it is difficult to see why, if the parties intended a restricted construction to be placed 
upon the reference to other minerals, they should use a word so completely unrestricted in 
meaning.”). 
19. Id. 
20. See, e.g., Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (“No doubt 
every inorganic component of the earth’s crust is legally cognizable as mineral, if the parties 
affected choose so to deal with it; and this no doubt is true regardless of whether it may be 
removed or extracted for commercial or other profitable purposes.”); see also Scott v. Laws, 215 
S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (acknowledging that a grant or exception of “all minerals” includes “all 
inorganic substances which can be taken from the land,” and that in order to restrict that meaning, 
“there must be qualifying words or language, evidencing that the parties contemplated something 
less general”).  But see Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43-44 (1882) (acknowledging that if 
the reservation of “minerals” was intended to be as broad as the scientific definition of that word, 
it would be as broad as the grant and therefore void; thus, the court undertook to limit the 
definition by applying a community knowledge test). 
21. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 455. 
22. See, e.g., Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996); Davis v. 
Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 89 (W. Va. 1963). 
23. Sensibly, such evidence would be superfluous – if the court decides that the instrument is 
susceptible to a single reasonable interpretation, no amount of additional evidence could change 
that.  See, e.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002 
(Wyo. 1988). 
24. See, e.g., Farrell v. Sayre, 270 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo. 1954). 
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The most fervent criticism of courts’ reliance on certain canons to 
construe mineral deeds centers on this ambiguity determination.25  As 
discussed in Part III, many of the canons frequently employed to determine 
the legal effect of a grant or reservation of “minerals” require the court to 
consider surrounding circumstances to discern the parties’ intent.26  Those 
who defend this reliance on outside evidence cling to the accurate notion 
that such facts may be considered where parties’ “presumed intent 
[inherently] consists of extraneous circumstances and conditions which 
existed at the time and place of the transaction which produced the 
conveyance.”27  However, courts often manipulate the process by admitting 
such evidence in the first instance, rather than limiting the use of 
surrounding circumstantial evidence to resolve ambiguous language.28  This 
evidence has been admitted to shape the court’s initial determination 
regarding the existence of ambiguity. 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals offered a prime example 
of this confusion in West Virginia Department of Highways v. Farmer.29  In 
deciding whether sand and gravel were included within a reservation of 
“oil, gas and other minerals,” the court accurately summarized West 
Virginia precedent, which allowed extrinsic evidence only if necessary to 
construe an instrument the court has found facially ambiguous.30  In the 
court’s words: 
It has long been held that where language in a deed is 
unambiguous there is no need for construction and it is the duty of 
the court to give every word its usual meaning.  However, where 
ambiguity is introduced by the restrictive language, making 
unclear the intention of the grantors in reserving 
minerals . . . construction of the language is in order and the 
surrounding circumstances and actions of the parties may be 
considered.31 
With an interesting turn in logic, the court then contradicted this accurate 
statement of the law in the very next sentence of the opinion, finding that 
 
25. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 8, at 12. 
26. See infra Part III for a discussion of the various canons. 
27. ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INST., 3-84 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 
84.02[1][d][2], at 84-12 (2d ed. 2012) (citing cases). 
28. See, e.g., id. § 84.01[3], at 84-9 (“What may be especially perplexing is the frequent 
consideration by the courts of extrinsic evidence to determine whether or not there is ambiguity.  
Only after ambiguity has been determined is resort to extrinsic evidence theoretically justified or 
permissible.”); see also Pierce, supra note 8, at 12. 
29. 226 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976). 
30. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719. 
31. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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the generalized reservation of “other minerals,” when “considered along 
with the surrounding circumstances and past activities concerning this 
property, creates an ambiguity as to the [parties’] intent . . . .”32  Based on 
this language, Farmer is often attacked for subverting parol evidence 
standards by considering surrounding circumstances to create, rather than 
resolve, ambiguity in the text.33  Nonetheless, other jurisdictions have 
allowed evidence of surrounding circumstances at this “pre-ambiguous” 
stage to aid in the intent pursuit,34 a practice which has been endorsed in the 
Restatement of Property.35 
The policy considerations discussed above are vital to the court’s 
process of finding whether ambiguity exists in its construction of the term 
“minerals.”  However a court makes that determination, whether by means 
of extrinsic evidence or not, if it determines that the instrument is 
ambiguous, it must then decide what evidence may be admitted to resolve 
the dispute.  Even though at this point the deed has been declared 
ambiguous, courts will still attempt to ascertain the parties’ intent as 
determined by this new wider universe of evidence.  Courts generally aim 
to construe deed language as intended by the parties at the time and place of 
the conveyance.36  In oil and gas disputes, this causes a host of practical 
problems.  Foremost among these is one of simple chronology:  a typical 
mineral title suit arises decades after the instrument(s) involved were 
executed.  The original parties to the contract are rarely involved at the 
litigation stage.37  Moreover, it is often the case that these original parties 
“have given no thought whatever to whether the substance in question 
should be included in or excluded from the grant or reservation of 
minerals.”38 
In such cases, the court’s determination becomes more objective in 
nature.  The intent of the parties is determined to be simply that which a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have intended, assuming 
 
32. See id. (emphasis added). 
33. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 456 (suggesting that the Farmer court was 
“apparently countenancing the use of extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity in an otherwise 
unambiguous reservation”). 
34. See, e.g., Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719. 
35. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 14 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940)). 
36. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747, 749 (Va. 1903) (explaining that the term 
“minerals” in the contract did not cover coal because at the time of contracting gold was the 
minerals on the mind of people in that area, and coal did not become valuable until more than 
forty years later).  But see Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (noting that in a previous 
case in Kentucky, a deed of “all minerals . . . on described tract,” conveyed all minerals other than 
those expressly excepted, and even conveyed diamond though neither party knew of its existence 
on the property at the time or explored for it). 
37. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 12, at 444. 
38. See id. 
          
2012] CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 657 
that the relevant substance was specifically considered in the first 
instance.39  Thus, the court’s purported “intent” finding may inherently 
require it to consider extrinsic evidence and construct the scope of 
“minerals” through use of circumstantial canons described below.40  As 
discussed above, opening the door to outside evidence raises procedural 
concerns and highlights the tension between the policy goals of freedom of 
contract and stable, predictable title.41 
C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SHAPING JUDICIAL PROCESS 
In order to appreciate the necessary-when-proper role that canons of 
construction play in judicial decision making, it is vital to understand the 
conflict that shapes them.  Our deep-rooted legal traditions protecting a 
general freedom to contract cannot be overstated.  As such, the court’s 
enforcement of a valid, lawful written agreement will always be constructed 
upon this “intent-based” interpretive rule in contract and property disputes.  
However, “the process by which intent is ascertained frequently determines 
the meaning of the instrument.  Manipulating process can manipulate 
meaning.”42  This judicial “process manipulation” thus needs coherent and 
fair balance between competing interests.43  In the oil and gas context, 
courts must compromise two overarching policy aims:  the traditional 
protections of contractual freedom, and the alienability of real property 
encouraged by the predictability of land titles.44 
This tension was well covered in a recent work by Professor David 
Pierce, in which he explained the “free will vs. predictability” dichotomy.45  
First, there is a public “desire to give effect to the free will of the parties to 
an instrument by recognizing and protecting ‘freedom of contract.’”46  The 
courts endorse this policy by upholding the rights of parties to enter and 
enforce the terms of their agreements.47 
 
39. See id. 
40. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954) (“[I]n determining 
the meaning of a conveyance or reservation of minerals, regard may be had not only of the 
language of the deed, but also to the situation of the parties, the business in which they were 
engaged and the substance of the transaction.”). 
41. But see Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Ky. 1952) (noting that unless the 
language was “so ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation otherwise[,]” the 
parol evidence rule barred extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of the contract). 
42. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 2-4 (noting the parol evidence rule as clear example of 
judicial process that frames a court’s search for meaning) (emphasis in original). 
43. See id at 2 (“The important question in this jurisprudential scheme of things, ‘When 
should process override meaning?’”). 
44. See id. at 3, 5. 
45. See id. at 3-14. 
46. See id. at 3. 
47. See id. 
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Often pushing against this free-contract theory is “the desire for 
predictability that can be obtained by adopting bright-line objective rules of 
interpretation.”48  From this perspective, the courts should give greater 
weight to considerations of title stability and predictability when construing 
deeds.  Stability would be most effectively achieved by establishing reliable 
precedent to control interpretation in future cases; however, the practical 
difficulty of applying such precedent to decades-old instruments remains a 
strong barrier to such objectivity.49  In the absence of formal rules, one 
avenue to greater predictability may come from improved consistency 
within construction process; in particular, courts should clarify whether the 
deed constructed as a matter of law or fact bears weight on the outside 
universe of real estate conveyance.50 
In construing oil and gas instruments, the courts must balance these 
policies:  freedom of contract, on the one hand, and the stability and 
predictability of title, on the other.  As the above discussion suggests, 
clinging too tightly to one policy consideration will ultimately sacrifice the 
other.51  In practice, free contract rights are further promoted with a courts’ 
enforcement of clear instrument language;52 however, the judicial process 
“will accurately reflect the parties’ free will only to the extent the judge’s 
perceptions of what is ‘unambiguous’ and what the language in the 
instrument ‘means’ coincide with those of the parties.”53  Thus, this 
balancing is achieved within the judicial decision making process that seeks 
to effectuate the intent of the parties, but limits that inquiry to the extent 
that such intent is expressed by the clear and unambiguous language of the 
instrument.54  Of course, this search for objective intent itself may become a 
confused and troublingly subjective method.  While debate continues over 
the appropriate role canons play in this arena, their current status remains 
unfortunate as they fail to adequately promote contractual freedoms, 
jeopardize title stability, and deprive the holders of surface and mineral 
estates alike of consistent and predictable ownership. 
 
 
48. See id. at 5. 
49. See id. at 5-6. 
50. See id. at 6. 
51. See id. (“The basic problem with the competing policies of predictability and free will is 
that one can only be maximized at the expense of the other.”). 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 4. 
54. See id. at 7 (“The only acknowledged compromise between predictability and free will 
has been the rule that the search for intent is a search for the ‘objective’ intent of the parties as 
opposed to their ‘subjective’ intent.”). 
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III. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION APPLIED: 
WHAT IS A MINERAL? 
The full gamut of canons of construction applied across jurisdictions is 
nearly unquantifiable.55  To tailor the bounds of this mineral discussion, this 
Part introduces canons most commonly endorsed by producing states, 
including those detailed in Part IV’s multi-state survey.  This Part discusses 
these canons in two general categories with respect to their role in the 
court’s application.  Acknowledging theoretical questions in any attempt to 
sever one “set” of canons from another, the first category of “textual” 
canons concerns judicial construction of the actual instrument language,56 
while the second category of “circumstantial” canons focuses more on the 
court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence. 
A. FOUR CORNERS AND HARMONIZATION 
The interpretive principles known as the “four corners” and 
“harmonization” canons are now uniformly-followed maxims of contract 
interpretation.  Though distinct, these work in tandem to describe the 
objective intent sought by the court.  Generally speaking, the four corners 
doctrine calls upon the court to “ascertain the intent of the parties from all 
of the language in the deed.”57  To the extent possible, the court will 
consider the entirety of an instrument and afford each provision equal 
weight in discerning an “overall intent” expressed by the deed.58 
Rarely applied alone, the four corners typically couples with the 
doctrine of harmonization to resolve ambiguities that arise when 
considering an instrument in its entirety.  This rule directs a court to 
minimize openness to ambiguity by attempting to “harmonize all parts of 
the deed” while holding the parties to have “intend[ed] every clause to have 
some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement.”59 
The court’s proper reliance on the four corners and harmonization 
canons gives effect to all provisions of a deed and, to the extent possible, 
even where they appear contradictory or inconsistent.60  In turn, no part of 
the instrument should be struck “unless there is an irreconcilable conflict 
 
55. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 2-6. 
56. This first “textual” category includes:  four corners and harmonization, plain meaning, 
contra proferentum, and ejusdem generis. 
57. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991) (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 
S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957)). 
58. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747, 749 (Va. 1903) (“In the construction of a contract 
the whole instrument is to be considered; not any one provision only, but all its provisions . . . .”). 
59. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986)). 
60. See id. 
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wherein one part of the instrument destroys in effect another part 
thereof.’”61  As shown in Part IV’s survey, this basic notion is often 
overlooked by the courts. 
B. PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING 
As commonly applied to all types of contracts, courts frequently 
employ a plain meaning approach to “minerals” in oil and gas 
instruments.62  This canon steers the court’s construction toward a common, 
ordinary definition of a word, in a way the court finds a reasonable member 
of the relevant public would understand it.63  This canon’s impact rests on 
the court’s delineation of the public of reference – thus its apparent 
“textual” focus is inherently factual based on the relationship and dealings 
between the contracting parties. 
C. CONTRA PROFERENTUM 
The canon of construction known as contra proferentum, or construe 
“against the drafter,” has long been a cornerstone of contract dispute 
resolution.64  Its application is simple and justifiable:  because the drafting 
party to a contract maintained final control over the language used, that 
party should in turn bear the burden of ambiguities that later give rise to 
litigation.  Thus, contra proferentum holds that a court will resolve 
ambiguity in the contract with deference to the nondrafting party.65 
D. EJUSDEM GENERIS 
The canon known as ejusdem generis is applicable only in cases where 
mineral description at issue provides two or more specific substances 
followed by the apparent catchall, “and all other minerals.”  Ejusdem 
 
61. Id. (quoting Benge v. Scharbauer, 259 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1953)). 
62. See generally Pierce, supra note 8, at 20. 
63. See, e.g., Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882) (“The best construction is that 
which is made by viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; 
for . . . it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed 
it.”); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954) (stating that when in doubt over 
the meaning, the term should be given the meaning customary in the area in which the deed will 
operate). 
64. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INST., supra note 27, § 84.02[1][c], at 84-
11. 
65. Some courts and authors label this canon “construe against the grantor,” but the canon 
more accurately concerns the party that controls the final terminology used in the instrument 
irrespective of the grantor-grantee status.  See Dep’t of Highways v. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d 717, 720 
(W. Va. 1976) (“[W]here an ambiguity exists in an instrument, the language will be construed 
against the grantor.”); see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW INST., supra note 27, § 84.02[1][c], at 84-
11. 
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generis, meaning “of the same kind,” holds that “where general words 
follow the enumeration of particular minerals, the general words will be 
construed as applicable only to minerals of the same general character or 
class as those enumerated.”66 
The drawbacks to applying ejusdem generis consistently are readily 
apparent.  Despite its textual focus, courts lack any objective standard for 
guidance in choosing the qualities that the named substances share, and 
which of those will be determinative to define the class of minerals 
conveyed or reserved together.  For example, in Luse v. Boatman,67 a Texas 
appellate court keenly explained: 
If we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis, what qualities or 
peculiarities of the specified type, “coal,” shall be considered in 
determining the classification intended by the use of the word 
“mineral”?  Are we to classify according to value?  If so, can it be 
said that oil and gas on the one hand and coal on the other are of 
different kinds or species of minerals?  If we classify as to use, is it 
not true that all three are used for fuel?  Shall the classification be 
determined by the form, density, color, weight, value or uses of the 
particular species mentioned? . . .  [A]re we justified in limiting the 
minerals intended to be included in the reservation to those only 
which are found in a solid state?68 
These observations in Luse have garnered significant support, leading some 
courts to reject the canon altogether.69 
Nonetheless, many courts continue to cite ejusdem generis to support a 
given deed construction, so long as the resulting construction does not 
vitiate the plain meaning of the language.70  As observed over a century ago 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in rejecting an ejusdem generis analysis, 
canons of construction in general must retain their proper place in the 
court’s construction and therefore “must not be applied so as to make them 
masters, since they are designed as servants merely.”71  Moreover, this 
 
66. See, e.g., McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 314, 316-17 
(Ky. 1909) (finding that a deed that conveyed “all minerals such as coal, iron, silver, gold, copper, 
lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc or any other minerals of any marketable value,” did not convey gas 
because the phrase “any other minerals of any marketable value” was limited to substances of the 
same character as those previously named (emphasis added)). 
67. 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. 1919). 
68. Luse, 217 S.W. at 1099. 
69. See, e.g., id. at 1099-1100; Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973); see 
also Reeves, supra note 12, at 447. 
70. See, e.g., West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 393, 396-401 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) 
(applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to determine that “oil, gas and other minerals” did not 
include any interest in copper, silver, gold, or any type of metallic ores or minerals). 
71. Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Cnty., 93 P. 53, 56 (Utah 1907). 
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canon generally does not apply if its impact would undermine what the 
court has deemed to be the parties’ clear intent in closing the mineral class – 
either with “all-encompassing” language or “where the particular things 
enumerated are complete so that there remains not others of like kind.”72 
E. COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE TEST 
The first “circumstantial” canon relevant to this discussion is the so-
called community knowledge test.  This test establishes the principle that 
the term “minerals” should be defined as the relevant community 
understood it at the time and place of conveyance.73  Significant policy 
concerns arise from judicial reliance on the community knowledge test.  By 
its very definition, this canon calls for circumstantial evidence of general 
perceptions, interpretations, and similar norms with respect to the 
referential public or community.  As such, several courts and commentators 
denounce the community knowledge test because it requires a court to 
consider extrinsic evidence from the outset.74  When its focus weighs so 
heavily on such extrinsic showings as a matter of course, a court risks 
undermining the primary, proper goal of its inquiry:  to determine the 
meaning of contract language as it was understood, intended, and written by 
the executing parties.  Much like pitfalls related to ejusdem generis noted 
above, a court applying the community knowledge standard must ultimately 
draw the line somewhere in establishing the scope of the relevant 
community.  In doing so, the court inherently may define the term by virtue 
of framing the community to its conclusion, rather than the more 
appropriate inverse.75  As such, even a sound application of the community 
knowledge test is often criticized canons for an over-reliance on 
particularized facts that can offer no predictable guidance beyond the case 
at hand.  In other words, this test is “nothing but legal fluff to support 
whatever result the trier [sic] of fact thinks is fair in a particular case.”76  
 
72. See Reeves, supra note 12, at 450. 
73. See, e.g., White v. Sayers, 45 S.E. 747 (Va. 1903) (interpreting the term “minerals” based 
upon the intentions at the time and place the deed was executed). 
74. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law:  The 
Continuing Search for Analytical Foundations, 47 ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX. § 
1.02[2][a], at 1-5 (1996) (“[The community knowledge test] has proven to be a rather fickle test 
and therefore custom made for the sort of result-oriented shell game jurisprudence needed to ‘do 
equity’ in individual cases.”); McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 (Colo. 2000) 
(noting that when courts base decisions upon evidence of the original parties’ intent many decades 
later, it leads to more litigation and uncertainty). 
75. See, e.g., McCormick, 14 P.3d at 353 n.7 (criticizing reliance on extrinsic evidence to 
find intent, stating that such “intent” is too often a result of the rules of evidence relating to proof 
and presumption more than a result of the parties’ actual intent). 
76. See Pierce, supra note 74, at 1-5. 
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Even so, this test is one of the most popularly applied canons among the 
states included in the state survey herein.77 
F. SURFACE DESTRUCTION TEST 
Another fact-based standard, the surface destruction test, has been 
followed by a number of jurisdictions.78  This canon is typically applied 
where a grant or reservation of “other minerals” is purported to encompass 
extraction techniques that threaten the value of the severed surface estate.79  
In this scenario, a court applying the surface destruction test may consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine whether extraction of the disputed mineral 
genuinely jeopardizes the surface estate.  If surface destruction is likely to 
follow proposed extraction, the court will refuse to include such substances 
within the minerals conveyed.80 
Since its early popularization in Texas, the surface destruction canon 
has been reformulated on numerous occasions.81  This test gained 
substantial criticism after its application by the Texas Supreme Court in 
Acker v. Guinn,82 which called for immediate referral to extrinsic evidence 
of extraction practices to aid its initial determination of what minerals were 
conveyed by generalized language.83  Acker caused particular backlash 
because the court’s destruction finding provided the fundamental basis for 
its holding, even where that construction was in direct conflict with clear 
language in the instrument.84 
In response, the Texas Supreme Court eventually undercut the breadth 
of the surface destruction test in Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp.85  The Moser 
court lamented reliance on outside facts as a source of uneasiness in the 
marketplace:  because Acker “required the determination of several fact 
issues to establish whether the owner of the surface or the mineral estate 
owns a substance not specifically referred to in [the instrument] . . . it could 
 
77. See infra Part IV. 
78. See, e.g., Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190, 193 (Va. 1966) (determining that a grant of 
“minerals” did not include sand and gravel, partially based upon the following rationale:  “The 
sand and gravel on the Shores tract are an integral part of the surface. . . .  [T]here was no other 
way possible to remove the sand except by going in from the surface; [] any sort of deep mining 
would cause the top to collapse because it is all sand . . . ”). 
79. Id. (“The sand under the surface could not be removed without taking the surface.”). 
80. See Pierce, supra note 74, at 1-6. 
81. See Brant M. Laue, Note, Interpretation of “Other Minerals” in a Grant or Reservation 
of a Mineral Interest, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 618, 624-26 (1986). 
82. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). 
83. Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 351-54. 
84. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984); Reed v. 
Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 746-47 (Tex. 1980). 
85. 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984). 
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not be determined from the grant or reservation alone who owned title to an 
unnamed substance.”86  The court rejected an argument that mineral 
ownership findings should rest on surface damage showings, as it provides 
no predictable guidance and sacrifices the interest in title stability.87  Today, 
Texas courts adhere to Moser’s clearer, plain meaning approach in place of 
the rule in Acker.88  In fact, the court expressly held that “a severance of 
mineral in an oil, gas, and other minerals clause includes all substances 
within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their 
presence or value is known at the time of severance.”89 
IV. STATE SURVEY 
Part IV analyzes primary case law from several jurisdictions, 
highlighting the courts’ application of relevant canons of construction to 
resolve ambiguous use of the term “mineral” in describing the property 
conveyed or reserved by a given instrument.  To determine mineral 
ownership, courts are often required to interpret language in deeds executed 
decades earlier.  To add difficulty to this complex task, courts must 
recognize that although the language in any particular deed has remained 
static, the mineral extraction industries have evolved significantly as a 
result of new discoveries and advances in technology.  For that reason, 
parties to an instrument, or their successors, frequently disagree over the 
effect of a conveyance many years later and rely on a court of competent 
jurisdiction to settle the dispute. 
One issue that has spawned considerable litigation in producing states 
is the effect of using the term “minerals” in a deed, whether in the grant or 
in the exception or reservation, to describe a particular mineral estate.  As 
an example, a deed conveying fee title will describe the relevant tract of 
land and designate a particular substance, e.g., coal, which the grantor will 
retain.  Rather than explicitly listing all substances included in the 
reservation, the specifically enumerated substance is frequently followed by 
general terms, such as “and other minerals” or “and other valuable 
minerals.”  The arguably ambiguous nature of this appendage causes 
conflict when parties later disagree over exactly what substances were 
thereby conveyed (or reserved).  This is especially true when it is indeed 
 
86. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101 (citing Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Spears, J., 
Concurring)). 
87. See id. at 104-05. 
88. See Laue, supra note 81, at 634-38. 
89. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102. 
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those “other minerals,” rather than the substances explicitly stated, that 
become the object of a very lucrative industry.90 
The resolution of the question “[w]hat does the term ‘minerals’ mean?” 
has been different among the several states, depending upon the approach 
taken.  Courts have applied various canons of construction, including the 
community knowledge test, ejusdem generis, the rule of practical 
construction, the exceptional use or value test, and construe against the 
grantor (or drafter).  In a few states, the interpretation of “minerals” has 
become a matter of property law, and no extrinsic evidence will be 
admissible to alter the meaning attributed by settled precedent.91  However, 
most states allow extrinsic evidence to be admitted if the language is 
ambiguous or is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
A. COLORADO 
Colorado courts have applied the community knowledge test in the 
past, although the definition of “minerals” in this context, to an extent, is 
now a matter of property law.  In 1954, the Supreme Court of Colorado was 
asked to settle a dispute over whether “minerals” included sand and gravel.  
In Farrell v. Sayre,92 the court interpreted a special warranty deed from 
1940 that contained the following language:  “excepting and reserving all 
mineral and mineral rights and rights to enter upon the surface of the land 
and extract the same.”93  The entire surface of the land consisted of sand 
and gravel, and the landowner, Ferrell, and the grantor, Sayre, disagreed as 
to who owned that gravel.94  The Supreme Court of Colorado noted that 
when the reservation is in general terms, the decision will turn upon the 
intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the deed.95  Because the 
surface was nothing but sand and gravel, the court found it “surely was not 
contemplated that the parties intended to nullify the grant without some 
direct specification in the reservation.”96  The controlling principles were as 
follows: 
[F]irst, . . . the word “minerals” when found in a reservation out of 
a grant of land means substances exceptional in use, in value and 
 
90. As stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court, “[i]t is seldom mentioned that one of the 
properties of a mineral is that often, when newly discovered in valuable quantities, it creates 
lawsuits.”  Lee v. Frank, 313 N.W.2d 733, 734 (N.D. 1981). 
91. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A, F. 
92. 270 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1954). 
93. Farrell, 270 P.2d. at 191. 
94. Id. at 191-92. 
95. Id. at 192. 
96. Id.  The court also stated that the trial court wrongly considered acts of the plaintiff, 
Farrell, “who was not a party to [the original] deed,” and other mere side transactions.  Id. 
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in character . . . and does not mean the ordinary soil of the district 
which if reserved would practically swallow up the grant . . . ; and 
secondly . . . in deciding whether or not in a particular case 
exceptional substances are “minerals” the true test is what that 
word means in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial 
world and landowners at the time of the grant, and whether the 
particular substances was so regarded as a mineral . . . .97 
Less than ten years later, the Court of Appeals of Colorado again 
decided whether a reservation of “oil, gas and other minerals” operated to 
reserve gravel.98  The court noted the reservation of “all minerals” is 
“inherently ambiguous” and referred to the controlling principles stated in 
Farrell, before deciding that it was proper for the trial court to have 
considered extrinsic evidence.99  The evidence showed the topsoil of the 
entire parcel was underlain by gravel and that at the time of the reservation 
the term “mineral” did not, as a matter of law, include gravel.100  The court 
then stated the trial court would have had a duty to bring within the 
meaning of “mineral” any substance the parties actually intended, whether 
or not that substance met the criteria set forth in Farrell.101  In Morrison, 
however, the parties did not intend gravel to be included in the 
reservation.102  The foregoing cases evidence an attempt by the court to give 
meaning to the original parties’ intent with resort to these “controlling 
principles.” 
As recently as 2000, the Supreme Court of Colorado was again asked 
to determine what was intended by the term “minerals.”  In McCormick v. 
Union Pacific Resources Co.,103 landowners sought to quiet title to the oil 
and gas in various tracts of land that had been conveyed by way of five 
deeds from the Union Pacific Railroad Company (“UPRC”) between 1906 
and 1909.104  Three of those deeds reserved “all coal and other minerals 
within or underlying said lands,” and two reserved “all oil, coal and other 
minerals within or underlying said lands.”105  The landowners claimed the 
 
97. Id. at 192-93 (quoting Waring v. Foden, 86 A.L.R. 969, 979 (1932)). 
98. Morrison v. Socolofsky, 600 P.2d 121, 122 (Colo. App. 1979). 
99. Id. (stating the court below considered maps prepared by the Colorado Geological Survey 
and results of test hole drilling). 
100. Id.  This conclusion was also based upon testimony of a geologist consultant in the 
gravel industry and agricultural lenders and landowners as to the common meaning of the term 
“mineral.”  Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 123. 
103. 14 P.3d 346 (Colo. 2000). 
104. McCormick, 14 P.3d at 347-48. 
105. Id. at 348. 
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(1) failure to specify oil and gas as to three properties and gas as to two 
properties, (2) lack of much oil and gas production in the area at the time of 
conveyance, and (3) UPRC’s progressive insertion of particular substances 
in its deed reservation language as industries developed (i.e., from “coal” to 
“coal and oil” to “coal, oil, and gas”) all demonstrated UPRC’s intent not to 
include those substances in the reservation.106  The landowners requested a 
trial on the issue with the inclusion of this “extrinsic evidence” to show the 
parties’ intent.107 
The Supreme Court of Colorado initially agreed with the lower courts, 
finding “the term ‘other minerals’ in a deed reservation in Colorado has the 
settled meaning of including oil and gas.”108  The court then stated the 
relevant issues in the appeal, which were cases of first impression:  (1) is 
the term “minerals” in a general deed reservation unambiguous as a matter 
of law, such that no extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show a contrary 
intent; and (2) does “minerals” include, as a matter of law, all oil, gas and 
valuable subsurface substances?109  The court held that “Colorado adheres 
to the majority rule that the deed reservation language ‘other minerals’ 
reserves oil and gas.”110  To support this statement, it confirmed that 
subsurface minerals may be severed from the surface estate.111  Although 
the word “mineral” can take on different meanings in different contexts,112 
“the trial court’s determination [of] summary judgment was appropriate in 
this case.”113  In making this determination, the court relied on esteemed 
commentary, such as the following: 
Barring the unusual case where ambiguities exist in the language 
of [a] grant or reservation and parol evidence is allowed to prove 
what was really intended in a given conveyance, the law is 
basically settled . . . .  Barring other factors, most courts today will 








111. Id. at 349. 
112. Id. 
113. Id.  Note that although the court holds that Colorado follows the majority rule that a 
reservation of “minerals” includes “oil and gas” and that this meaning is “settled,” it appears to 
limit this holding, as does the commentary it cites, by using phrases such as “in this case,” 
“[b]arring the unusual case where ambiguities exist,” and “unless there was a demonstrated 
intention to the contrary.”  Id. at 347, 341, 351. 
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or of “all minerals” will be inclusive of oil and gas and all 
constituent hydrocarbons.114 
 
The courts are practically unanimous in holding that oil and gas 
are minerals in the broad and general sense in which that term is 
used.  These decisions would seem to fix a common standard of 
meaning on the term, and it is a general rule, adhered to by a 
majority of the courts, that a conveyance or exception of minerals 
includes oil and gas, unless from the language of the instrument, or 
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the 
time of its execution, it is found that the term was used in a more 
restricted sense.115 
 
The majority position is to construe a general reference to 
“minerals” to include oil and gas unless there was a demonstrated 
intention to the contrary.116 
 
In most of the producing states it is a rule of property that the term 
“minerals” includes oil and gas unless the instrument creating the 
mineral interest by grant or reservation reveals that the parties 
intended the term to have a more restrictive meaning.  Extrinsic 
evidence of intent in this regard is generally admissible only where 
the language of the instrument is ambiguous.117 
The court then discussed the reservations in the case at bar.  It gave the 
history of the grants to UPRC and of the various conveyances from UPRC 
using deed forms that included reservations like those at issue.118  Rather 
than look to the language of the instruments themselves, the court noted that 
its sister states of Wyoming, Utah, and Arizona have all conclusively held 
the term “other minerals” in these railroad conveyances includes oil and 
gas.119  Based on the precedent in other states, on “Colorado precedent, 
 
114. Id. at 349 (quoting Phillip G. Dufford, Conveying Oil and Gas Interests, in CATHY 
STRICKLIN KRENDL, 1B COLORADO METHODS OF PRACTICE § 10.1, at 9-10 (1997)). 
115. Id. at 351 (quoting 1A W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 135, at 268 
(1954)). 
116. Id. (quoting Robert G. Pruitt Jr., Mineral Terms – Some Problems in Their Use and 
Definitions, 11 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 12 (1966)) (emphasis added). 
117. Id. at 351 n.2 (quoting HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 
TERMS 427 (1981)) (emphasis added). 
118. Id. at 352-53. 
119. Id. at 353 (citing Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 820 F.2d 338, 
343 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Utah law); Union Pac. Land Res. Corp. v. Moench Inv. Co., 696 
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custom, usage, and learned commentary,” and on the need for an 
established rule of law that provides certainty rather than the need to rely on 
extrinsic evidence, the court determined the issue is a legal question that 
precludes resorting to extrinsic evidence and allows resolution by summary 
judgment.120 
In coming to this conclusion, it appears the court chose to disregard the 
analysis used, for example, in the Tenth Circuit case interpreting Utah law, 
Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v Union Pacific Railroad Co.121  In that 
case, rather than finding that extrinsic evidence should never be admitted to 
determine whether the parties intended the phrase “other minerals” to 
include “oil and gas,” the court appeared to read the clause as a whole to 
determine that it unambiguously included “oil and gas;” based on that 
determination, extrinsic evidence was not admitted to alter the clear 
intention shown on the face of the document.122  The McCormick court also 
appears to disregard the limiting language provided in the above 
commentary which seems to apply the majority “rule” more as a rebuttable 
presumption: that is, it should apply unless language exists to show a 
contrary intent.123 
The court skipped analysis of the deed as a whole to find that “other 
minerals” always includes “oil and gas.”124  It noted “[a]llowing the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence many decades after the deed 
conveyances . . . invites uncertainty and litigation, as necessary evidence 
has long since disappeared or sheds no real light on the parties’ individual 
intentions.”125  Additionally, “[a]ll too often this ‘intent’ as determined, 
results from application of the rules of evidence concerning burden of proof 
and presumptions, which have little relevance to the actual intent of the 
parties.”126  Based on the foregoing policy considerations, the court 
 
F.2d 88, 93 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Wyoming law); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 
261, 264 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Wyoming law); Spurlock v. Santa Fe. Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 
299, 308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)); Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 
P.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Wyo. 1988). 
120. Id. at 354. 
121. 820 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1987). 
122. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 820 F.2d at 343 (recounting and adopting the district 
court’s interpretation of a reservation of “all coal and other minerals,” which looked at the 
language in question in the context of the entire clause to determine that oil and gas was included 
as a matter of law and that no extrinsic evidence was admissible).  It is not clear whether this court 
intended its holdings to apply to all instances of the term “other minerals” or only to the term 
when used in similarly drafted instruments. 
123. See generally Pierce, supra note 74. 
124. This approach does, however, appear to be in line with most of the above-cited 
opinions.  See, e.g., Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); 
Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Wyo. 1988). 
125. McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 (Colo. 2000). 
126. Id. at 353 n.7. 
          
670 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:649 
concluded this matter should be treated as one of property law, and 
precedent acted to foreclose the question for trial.127  Therefore, as a matter 
of law in Colorado, “other minerals” includes oil and gas, and it appears 
that parties may not resort to extrinsic evidence to show contrary intent. 
B. KENTUCKY 
The effect of the term “minerals” in a deed, whether contained within 
the grant or within an exception or reservation, has a well settled meaning 
in Kentucky, which includes oil and gas unless a contrary intent is clearly 
indicated.  In reaching this conclusion, Kentucky courts have used a 
practical construction approach and appear to reject both the community 
knowledge and exceptional characteristics tests.  The Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky first decided the issue in 1919 in the case of Scott v. Laws.128  
There, the grantor conveyed “all of the mineral right and coal privileges and 
rights-of-way to and from said minerals and coal privileges; also the right to 
search for all undiscovered minerals and coals upon the lands hereinafter 
described.”129  The court answered the first question relating to the interest 
granted, i.e., that this was a grant of title to the minerals, not just a mining 
privilege.130  It then addressed the contention that oil and gas did not 
pass.131 
The plaintiff relied on the case of McKinney’s Heirs v. Central 
Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,132 to assert the grant should not include oil and 
gas.133  In that case, the deed conveyed “all minerals, such as coal, iron, 
silver, gold, copper, lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc or any other mineral of 
any marketable value.”134  The Court of Appeals determined that the gas did 
not pass because the words “any other minerals of any marketable value” 
 
127. Id. at 354.  Note the concurring opinion in this case took issue with the court’s analysis.  
It states the majority failed to follow general principles of deed interpretation which state that (1) a 
primary goal of deed interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent, (2) intent may be found 
by extrinsic evidence if a deed is found to be ambiguous, (3) whether an ambiguity exists is a 
matter of law to be determined by the court, and (4) in deciding whether an ambiguity exists, a 
court may conditionally admit extrinsic evidence on the issue of ambiguity.  Id. at 354-55.  
Furthermore, the concurrence claims that by relying on the historical information to ascertain the 
meaning of the term “minerals,” the majority determines an issue of fact within the purview of a 
trial court and denied the landowners an opportunity to present their evidence to show a contrary 
meaning.  Id. at 355. 
128. 215 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1919). 
129. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82. 
130. Id. at 81-82. 
131. Id. 
132. 120 S.W. 314 (Ky. 1909). 
133. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82. 
134. Id. 
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should be read in conjunction with the things previously named.135  For that 
reason, the conveyance should be limited to things of a similar nature, 
which did not include oil and gas.136 
Scott acknowledged generally, a grant or exception of all minerals 
“will include all inorganic substances which can be taken from the land, and 
to restrict the meaning of the term there must be qualifying words or 
language, evidencing that the parties contemplated something less general 
than all substances legally cognizable as minerals.”137  The court then 
referred to Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Kentucky 
Transvaal Diamond Co.138 to distinguish McKinney.139  The Kentucky 
Diamond Mining opinion held “a deed of ‘all minerals . . . on described 
tract,’ excluding coal for the use of the farm, conveyed all the minerals 
excepting the coal reserved” and passed diamond even though neither party 
knew of its existence or prospected for it at the time.140  Therefore, because 
oil and gas are minerals and nothing in the deed before the Scott court 
evidenced an intent to convey anything less general than all substances 
legally classifiable as minerals, the oil and gas passed.141 
The foregoing issue has been presented before the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky in numerous other cases where parties have sought a 
determination that the variation in their granting or reserving clause 
distinguished their deed from established precedent.  However, the same 
result has been applied to a wide array of language, which as noted in the 
1952 case, Gibson v. Sellars:142 
This court has long since established the rule that the term 
“minerals” includes oil and gas, and that a reservation or exception 
of “coal and minerals” excepts the oil and gas. 
The many variations of the term which have been given the effect 
of including these substances are well illustrated by the specific 
provisions involved in the several cases.  In the Scott case, the 
term was “all the mineral right and coal privileges.”  In the 
 
135. Id. (quoting McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 315 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1909)). 
136. Id. (citing McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 120 S.W. 314, 315-16 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1909)).  Note the application of ejusdem generis in the McKinney case. 
137. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82. 
138. 132 S.W. 397 (Ky. 1910). 
139. Scott, 215 S.W. at 82. 
140. Id. (citing Ky. Diamond Mining Developing Co. v. Transvaal Diamond Co. 132 S.W. 
347, 398-99 (Ky. 1910)).  Note the rejection of the community knowledge and exceptional 
characteristics tests in the Kentucky Diamond Mining case. 
141. Id. 
142. 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952). 
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Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. case [86 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1935)] 
it was “all the coal, salt water, and minerals.”  In the Hurley case 
[171 S.W. 16 (Ky. 1943)] it was “all the coal, mineral and mining 
rights.”  The rule has been followed even though the conjunction 
“and” is omitted.  In the Berry case [198 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1946)], 
it was concluded that an exception of the “coal mineral rights” 
excepted the oil and gas.  In the Hosick case [39 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 
1931)], an exception of “coal minerals and mining privileges” was 
given the same effect.143 
In Gibson, the deed exception at issue was as follows:  “It is expressly 
understood and agreed by the parties that the coal and mineral rights 
underlying said tract of land have been heretofore sold by the First Party 
and are not intended to be conveyed by this deed and are expressly 
excluded therefrom.”144  However, the single prior out-conveyance was of 
coal only; therefore, the appellee argued that, when considered in light of 
the prior conveyance, the exception only covered coal, not oil and gas.145  
The court declined to consider the prior transaction, citing the parole 
evidence rule.146 
The parole evidence rule is a substantive rule of law as applied to 
contracts that requires the terms to be found in the writing itself.147  If the 
language has an obscure meaning or is susceptible to more than one 
meaning, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to clarify the language, but 
use of such extrinsic evidence is limited to cases where language “is so 
ambiguous or obscure in meaning as to defy interpretation otherwise.”148  
The fact that oil and gas had not been conveyed did not destroy the 
exception as to it; rather it was “at most only an erroneous recitation of fact 
and did not limit or restrict the effect of the exception.”149  The court found 
itself limited to construing the language in the deed without resort to the 
terms in prior conveyances to vary or alter the meaning of the words in the 
exception.150 
 
143. Gibson, S.W.2d at 913 (citations omitted). 
144. Id. at 912. 
145. Id. at 912-13. 
146. Id. at 913. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 914. 
150. Id. at 913 (“An extension of the [parol evidence] rule would result in chaos and 
confusion, and it would be impossible to determine the rights of the parties to a contract without 
viewing all the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document in question.”); see also 
Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Browning, 521 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1975). 
          
2012] CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 673 
The foregoing cases, as well as an assortment of other cases resolving 
similar disputes, have come to the same conclusion, that is, the word 
“mineral” in a deed includes oil and gas unless the language of the deed 
shows an intention to exclude those substances.151  Restrictive language, 
however, has rarely been found to show an intention that oil and gas does 
not come within the meaning of “minerals.”152  In at least in one instance, 
the court determined a conveyance of “coal minerals and mineral products” 
was ambiguous enough, due to the absence of commas, to warrant resort to 
testimony to determine if “coal” was used as an adjective qualifying 
“minerals” (in which case oil and gas was not included), almost identical 
language in more recent cases has been held to include oil and gas.153  And, 
as previously mentioned, this result is the same even if the parties to the 
deed did not know the particular substance was underlying those lands and 
the parties were not currently prospecting for same.154 
C. MISSISSIPPI 
The interpretation of the word “minerals” in Mississippi, at least so far 
as that word applies to cover oil and gas, appears to be settled.  In 
Witherspoon v. Campbell,155 the Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to 
 
151. See, e.g., Majors v. Easley, 328 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Ky. 1959); Gibson v. Sellars, 252 
S.W.2d 911, 912-13 (Ky. 1952); Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ky. 
1952); Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497, 497 (Ky. 1946); Fed. Gas, Oil & Coal 
Co. v. Moore, 161 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1941); Maynard v. McHenry, 113 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Ky. 
1938); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Preece, 86 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ky. 1935); Hudson v. McGuire, 223 
S.W. 1101, 1103 (Ky. 1920). 
152. Rice v. Blanton, 22 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Ky. 1929).  But see Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust 
Co., 248 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ky. 1952) (analyzing language that arguably could restrict the deed to 
only mining activity, coupled with a restriction that explicitly did not convey rights to surface use, 
but still determining that because no clear intention to retain oil and gas existed, it passed with the 
conveyance). 
153. See, e.g., Hudson v. McGuire, 223 S.W. 1101, 1101, 1102, 1106 (Ky. 1920) (overruling 
demurrer to plaintiff’s petition and allowing plaintiff to present extrinsic evidence concerning “the 
situation of the parties, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, and that it was 
not intended by the grantor or grantee that oil or gas rights or privileges should pass under it” 
where the conveyance was of “[a]ll the minerals (except stone coal), with necessary right of ways 
and privileges for prospecting, mining and smelting . . . . ,” because none of those terms could be 
applied to oil and gas production).  But see Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497, 
498 (Ky. 1946) (construing a reservation of “all coal mineral rights” to include oil and gas because 
punctuation is generally given only slight consideration, and “while the language of the 
reservation is faulty,” it was the result of negligence or inadvertence, not ignorance; “a proper 
construction of the reservation in question is that all minerals, including coal, were reserved in the 
deed in question”); Hurley v. West Ky. Coal Co., 171 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1943); Franklin 
Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 39 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky. 1931). 
154. See, e.g., Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (citing Ky. Diamond Mining & 
Developing Co. v. Ky. Transvaal Diamond Co., 132 S.W. 397 (Ky. 1910)). 
155. 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1954). 
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determine whether “all minerals” included gravel.156  The court applied 
various canons of construction in making the determination, including the 
rule of practical construction, the community knowledge test, and ejusdem 
generis.157 
To determine the meaning of the conveyance or reservation, the court 
in Witherspoon allowed resort to the language used in the particular 
instrument, the parties’ situation and business endeavors, and the substance 
at issue.158  The court noted that when in doubt, the meaning of the term 
should be restricted to that given by the custom of the country in which the 
deed is to operate.159  Although the court previously held “minerals” 
included gravel in Moss v. Jourdan,160 a case decided more than thirty years 
earlier, in Witherspoon it analyzed the changes that had taken place in 
Mississippi to conclude the Moss case was overruled.161 
The facts the Witherspoon court relied upon to overrule Moss were 
several.  First, even in Moss, the appellant was deemed the owner of the 
gravel due to his ownership of the minerals, but the appellee was not 
enjoined to interfere with removal of gravel because of the surface 
destruction it would cause.162  Second, in 1922, it was unknown whether 
oil, gas, or similar minerals existed in Mississippi, but the Tinsley Oil Field 
was discovered in Yazoo County in 1939 and grantors and grantees have 
been “oil and gas conscious in the execution of conveyances and 
reservations of minerals” since that time.163  Third, gravel is not typically 
included in transactions covering “solid” minerals, unless specifically 
mentioned.164  Fourth, parties who contract for “all the minerals” in place 
generally do not contemplate the open pit mining associated with gravel, 
which would destroy or devalue land.165  Finally, these transactions often 
list the relevant substances as “oil, gas and other minerals;” the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis can be applied so that only minerals of similar character to 
oil and gas are included within the more general term of “other 
minerals.”166  Based on the foregoing, it is apparent Mississippi courts rely 
 
156. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 385. 
157. See generally id. 
158. Id. at 386.  Note, however, that testimony of conversations between the parties was not 
considered competent for trial.  Id. 
159. Id. 
160. 92 So. 389 (Miss. 1922). 
161. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 389. 
162. Id. at 386. 
163. Id. at 388.  Here the court made use of community knowledge. 
164. Id. at 387. 
165. Id. at 388.  Note use of the surface destruction test. 
166. Id. 
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heavily on the circumstances at the time and place of execution to 
determine the meaning intended by the term “minerals.”  Because it 
concluded that oil and gas has been on the mind of grantors and grantees in 
the state since the discovery of oil and gas in 1937, presumably for all 
transactions entered into after that time, the term “minerals” encompasses 
those substances unless a contrary intent is clearly shown. 
D. NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota presents an unusual situation that has resolved many 
interpretive questions by statute.  North Dakota also has statutorily 
determined the answer to what minerals will be included in a conveyance.  
However, for contracts entered into prior to enactment of those statutes and 
for contracts to which the statutes do not apply, courts have tended to use a 
practical construction when giving meaning to the term “minerals.” 
In Lee v. Frank,167 the Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to 
determine the meaning of the following exception and reservation in a 1945 
deed: 
[E]xcepting and reserving, however, from these presents all ores 
and minerals beneath the surface of the above described premises, 
with the right to mine for and extract the same, provided that in the 
exercise of such mining right the surface thereof shall not be 
disturbed or interfered with and in nowise damaged. . . .168 
The parties agreed this clause effectively reserved coal to the grantors, but 
disagreed over the effect on the oil and gas rights.  After analyzing the issue 
based upon North Dakota precedent, the court determined this language 
effectively reserved all the oil, gas, coal, and other hydrocarbons.169 
As an initial matter, it was acknowledged that the term “minerals” is 
susceptible to multiple meanings, which may either be broad or narrow in 
scope, depending upon the context.170  When the term is used in a 
reservation in a written document, the general rule is that it indicates an 
intention to reserve all substances qualifying as “minerals.”171  It therefore 
becomes necessary to find qualifying circumstances, words, or context to 
 
167. 313 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1981). 
168. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 733-34. 
169. Id. at 734. 
170. Id. (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in 
which it is used.” (internal quotation marks omitted (citations omitted))). 
171. Id. (“Ordinarily then, the substance must appear in nature as a mineral and not merely 
be an element capable of being synthesized in a laboratory into a mineral.”). 
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determine what substances are included, by looking to the words used, 
custom and usage, statutes, precedent, or common sense.172 
The North Dakota Supreme Court previously determined the 
classification of minerals in this situation cannot be so broad that it defeats 
the grant by effectively reserving all of the soil itself.173  Oil and natural gas 
are generally considered “minerals,”174 as is coal175 and the term “mine” 
may be used to refer to oil and gas drilling operations.176  This precedent, 
however, did not supply a “rule-of-thumb formula” by with which to 
answer the question at issue.177 
To find qualifying context, the Lee court also referred to statutory 
provisions in the North Dakota Century Code.178  The Code contains 
provisions that are applicable to the interpretation of “minerals” in 
conveyances of mineral rights.  Those sections are as follows: 
All conveyances of mineral rights or royalties in real property in 
this state, excluding leases, shall be construed to grant or convey 
to the grantee thereof all minerals of any nature whatsoever except 
those minerals specifically excluded by name in the deed, grant, or 
conveyance, and their compounds and byproducts, but shall not be 
construed to grant or convey to the grantee any interest in any 
gravel, clay, or scoria unless specifically included by name in the 
deed, grant, or conveyance.179 
In all deeds, grants, or conveyances of the title to the surface of 
real property executed on or after July 1, 1983, in which all or any 
portion of the minerals are reserved or excepted and thereby 
effectively precluded from being transferred with the surface, all 
minerals, of any nature whatsoever, shall be construed to be 
reserved or excepted except those minerals specifically excluded 
by name in the deed, grant, or conveyance and their compounds 
and byproducts.  Gravel, clay, and scoria shall be transferred with 
 
172. Id.  Note the court’s use of the rule of practical construction. 
173. Id. (quoting Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 S.W.2d 502, 503 (N.D. 1959)).  See generally 
Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971). 
174. Id. (quoting State v. Amerada Petro. Corp., 49 N.W.2d 14, 15 (N.D. 1951)). 
175. Id. (citing Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972)); see also Olson v. Dillerud, 
226 N.W.2d 363, 365-68 (N.D. 1975); Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973) 
(explaining why ejusdem generis does not work to exclude coal when the specific term “oil and 
gas” is followed by the general term “other minerals”). 
176. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 734. (citing MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1957)). 
177. Id. at 735. 
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24, -25 (1999). 
179. Id. § 47-10-24.  The language provided is current, although this statute has undergone 
various edits since its enactment.  Because the current discussion is focused primarily on the 
court’s interpretation when the statute does not apply, other versions are not provided. 
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the surface estate unless specifically reserved by name in the deed, 
grant, or conveyance.180 
Based upon the holding of the North Dakota Supreme Court in 
McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co.,181 the reservation in Lee was not 
subject to the foregoing limiting statutory provisions, because that deed was 
executed prior to their enactment.182  However, the Code provides several 
sections applicable to all real property conveyance contracts, as follows: 
Grants shall be interpreted in like manner with contracts in general 
except so far as is otherwise provided by this chapter. . . .  [I]f 
several parts of a grant are absolutely irreconcilable, the former 
part shall prevail.  A clear and distinct limitation in a grant is not 
controlled by other words less clear and distinct.183 
A grant shall be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except that a 
reservation in any grant, and every grant by a public officer or 
body, as such, to a private party, is to be interpreted in favor of the 
grantor.184 
The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the 
language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity.185 
A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances 
under which it was made and the matter to which it relates.186 
All things that in law or usage are considered as incidental to a 
contract or as necessary to carry it into effect are implied 
therefrom, unless some of them are mentioned expressly therein.  
In such case, all other things of the same class are deemed to be 
excluded.187 
Because the court did not find (1) words of limitation in the 
reservation, (2) a limiting statute in effect at the time of the conveyance, or 
(3) qualifying custom, usage, circumstance, or context, it interpreted the 
reservation in favor of the grantor per North Dakota Century Code section 
47-09-13.188  Therefore, its final conclusion was that the exception and 
 
180. Id. § 47-10-25.  Because, as stated in the preceding footnote, we are not focused on the 
statutory interpretation, a history of the various forms of this statute is not given. 
181. 294 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1980). 
182. McDonald, 294 N.W.2d. at 393. 
183. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-11 (1999). 
184. Id. § 47-09-13. 
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-02 (2006). 
186. Id. § 9-07-12. 
187. Id. § 9-07-21 (setting out a modified version of ejusdem generis). 
188. Lee, 313 N.W.2d at 737. 
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reservation effectively “reserved ‘all’ metallic minerals and ‘all’ metallic 
ores, plus ‘all’ non-metallic solid, liquid or gaseous mineral whether known 
or later discovered (except insofar as it may be interpreted in a manner to 
defeat the conveyance of the soil itself).”189 
The foregoing discussion shows that a factor of primary significance in 
interpreting North Dakota mineral deeds is to determine whether the 
particular instrument is subject to the limiting statutes.  For instruments 
entered into prior to the enactment of the limiting statutes,190 the courts will 
rely on precedent to interpret the language.  The Reiss v. Rummel191 opinion 
shows how significantly the results can differ when courts use legal 
precedent versus statutory interpretation.  In Reiss, a mineral deed subject to 
the limiting statutes conveyed a fractional interest in certain enumerated 
minerals such as oil and gas and “all other minerals.”192  The court noted 
that although North Dakota precedent interprets the phrase “all other 
minerals” to include coal,193 that phrase “was insufficient to convey any 
interest in coal because it did not meet the specific requirements set out by 
statute.”194  Regarding language not subject to the statutes, a court will 
likely follow the process set out in Lee to determine if a particular substance 
was intended, requiring an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction in question.195 
E. OHIO 
Several cases in Ohio have dealt with the interpretation of oil and gas 
conveyances that are unclear as to which estate is conveyed and which is 
 
189. Id. 
190. See McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1980) 
(holding that the statute does not apply retroactively). 
191. Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975). 
192. Reiss, 232 N.W.2d at 41-42. 
193. Id. at 45 (citing Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549-51
 
(N.D. 1973); Abbey v. 
State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 856 (N.D. 1972); Adams Cty. v. Smith, 23 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D. 
1946)). 
194. Id.  Also, the Rummel court determined that North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-
24 was meant to be limited “only to those real property transactions where the owner conveyed 
mineral rights under the circumstances outlined by the statute,” and that its provisions do not 
apply to those transactions where grantors retained mineral rights by reservation or exception; the 
term “conveyed” in that section does not take on the meaning as defined in section 47-19-42.  Id. 
at 48. 
195. See MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 42-43 (N.D. 1957) (interpreting the meaning 
of “all other minerals” using canons of construction similar to those in Lee). 
It is thus clear that it would be not only impractical, but impossible to attempt to 
catalogue all the minerals which are, and which are not, included in the grant in the 
lease under consideration.  Decision as to whether any specific mineral is included in 
the lease must await a case in which an issue as to that mineral is raised. 
Id. at 43. 
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excepted or reserved from the conveyance.  The courts have proffered 
several guidelines by which to interpret deeds.  Among them is the notion 
that the purpose of interpreting the deed is to discern the parties’ intent, 
which is “presumed to reside in the language they chose to use.”196  
Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine intent when the deed is 
unclear or ambiguous “or when circumstances surrounding the agreement 
give the plain language special meaning.”197  Lastly, a contract is construed 
against the party who drew it.198 
Of course, these and other canons of construction may not have much 
significance in the abstract.  It is as applied to real deed provisions that they 
take on meaning.  The Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the following 
conveyance of a mining right in the case of Detlor v. Holland:199 
Do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey to the said [Grantee], his 
heirs and assigns, forever, all the coal of every variety and all the 
iron ore, fire clay and other valuable minerals in, on, or under the 
following described premises: . . . , together with the right in 
perpetuity . . . of mining and removing such coal, ore or other 
minerals; and . . . the right to the use of so much of the [surface] of 
the land as may be necessary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains, 
railroads, switches, sidetracks, etc., to facilitate the mining and 
removal of such coal, ore, or other minerals and no more.200 
One question in front of the court was whether the preceding language 
was sufficient to convey the oil and gas rights to the property, i.e., do the 
words “other valuable minerals” include petroleum?201  The court held that 
the right to petroleum oil in fact did not pass.202  Although the words “other 
valuable minerals” in a technical sense does include petroleum, the court 
clarified that the real question was whether the parties intended to include 
such oil in the mining right.203  In answering that question, the court 
considered the conveyance “in the light of the surrounding circumstances, 
and in view of the above rule of construction,”204 and upon authority of the 
 
196. Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690 (Ohio 1898). 
200. Detlor, pt. 1 (emphasis added). 
201. Id. at 692. 
202. Id. at 692-93. 
203. Id. at 692. 
204. Id. 
In determining what is included in a lease, the familiar rules of construction are 
applied.  The grant is construed most strongly against the grantor.  The whole contract 
must be considered in arriving at the meaning of any of its parts.  Terms are to be 
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case of Dunham & Short v. Kirkpatrick.205  The court noted that the grantor 
had no knowledge of oil in the area at that time and relied heavily upon the 
terms of the deed, which contained no language applicable to oil and gas 
operations or of extracting minerals of a migratory nature.206 
The Ohio Court of Appeals has also had occasion to interpret deeds 
covering mineral rights.  In Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger,207 a 1914 deed 
conveyed certain described property, but in the same paragraph as the 
description, the grantors excepted a portion as reserved by the granting 
clause: 
Excepting there is reserved unto said grantors, all the veins of coal 
and other substances of value underlying said above conveyed 
premises, together with all necessary rights of way and privileges 
of entry thereon to remove same, unto them, their heirs and assigns 
forever.208 
The question before the court was whether the exception reserved the oil 
and gas estate to the grantors.  The court looked to existing precedent of 
several states before looking to Ohio case law.  First, it noted that subjective 
testimony evidence as to the parties’ intent is inadmissible to vary the terms 
in a written contract.209  Also, parol evidence was “inadmissible to 
contradict or change the legal effect of a deed in determining the nature of 
the estate conveyed,” but rather the intent of the parties as evidenced by a 
construction of the whole instrument “in the light of the circumstances of 
each case” is controlling.210  The only objective evidence of circumstances 
provided in this case was the fact that oil had been struck on the property, 
and that hundreds of leases had been recorded in the county in the 
 
understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have acquired a 
particular technical sense by the known usage of the trade.  They are to be construed 
with reference to their commercial and their scientific import.  This rule is of especial 
importance when the question arises whether a specific mineral is included in a 
general designation. 
Id. 
205. Id.  See generally Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882) (holding that a 
reservation of “all minerals” does not include oil).  See infra Part IV.F for a discussion of 
Pennsylvania law, including the Dunham case. 
206. Detlor, 49 N.E. at 692-93. 
207. 250 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio 1969). 
208. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 270. 
209. Id. at 270 (emphasis added). 
210. Id. at 273-74.  Oddly, the court says that parol evidence is not admissible to change the 
legal effect of a deed, but rather that the court may determine the intent of the parties, which does 
affect the interpretation and therefore legal effect of a deed, by looking to the “circumstances of 
each case,” i.e., objective evidence of circumstances as of the time of execution. 
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preceding year, both factors which indicate the parties were aware of oil 
and gas activities.211 
The Court of Appeals compared the language in issue to the language 
in the Detlor decision.212  The deed in Detlor, which included “other 
valuable minerals” in the granting clause, was not held to convey oil and 
gas.  As we have previously noted, the Ohio Supreme Court in that case 
focused on the fact that the easements conveyed in connection with mining 
were not applicable to oil and gas operations, and that the circumstances 
surrounding Detlor were such that the grantor had no knowledge of oil 
being produced in the relevant area and only minimal production was in fact 
taking place.213  The Court of Appeals determined that the language of the 
easements in Stocker was not as restrictive, but in fact, was broad enough to 
cover both coal production and oil and gas production.214 
Moreover, the court in Stocker reviewed two other appeals court cases 
that arrived at seemingly inconsistent results.  In Gordon v. Carter Oil 
Co.,215 the granting clause of a 1902 deed conveyed “[a]ll the coal and other 
minerals under the surface of the [described] real estate.”216  The grant 
included an easement “to enter upon said land, make all excavations, drains, 
entries, and structures of whatever nature as may be necessary to 
conveniently take out said minerals, with a right of way over and across 
said land for the purpose of transferring said minerals. . . .”217  That court 
relied on Detlor to conclude that the transfer did not include oil and gas.218  
However, it did not set forth all the information relied upon other than to 
say that “under all the facts, circumstances, and surroundings of the case – 
if the testimony is to be relied upon – that the parties hereto did not intend 
or contemplate that oil and gas should be conveyed to the grantee in the 
deed now before us for construction.”219 
The same court decided the case of Hardesty v. Harrison,220 which 
construed the terms of a 1919 deed conveying coal, clay, and mineral rights 
on the relevant land.221  The decision, joined by Judge Houck who wrote the 
 
211. Id. at 273. 
212. Id. at 273-74. 
213. Id. (citing Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898)). 
214. Id. at 274. 
215. 19 Ohio App. 319 (1924). 
216. Gordon, 19 Ohio App. at 319-20. 
217. Id. at 320. 
218. Id. at 323. 
219. Id. at 322.  Note that the text appears to indicate that parol testimony evidence, namely 
testimony of the facts, circumstances, and surroundings of the case, was admitted, although we do 
not know to what extent. 
220. 6 Ohio Law Abs. 445 (Ohio App. 1928). 
221. Hardesty, 6 Ohio Law Abs. at 446. 
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Gordon decision four years earlier, found that oil and gas was included.222  
The opinion stated that although the defendant offered testimony that at the 
time of the conveyance only nonmigratory minerals were intended, parol 
evidence was not admissible to vary the terms of the contract; therefore, 
whatever was said on that earlier occasion could not be used in interpreting 
the words of the contract.223  Further, citing a Kentucky Court of Appeals 
case, the Ohio court stated, “it is a well settled law that petroleum oil is a 
mineral and is a part of the realty, like coal, iron and copper.  A grant 
without qualifying or limiting words of the minerals underlying certain real 
estate will include oil or gas.”224 
The averment in Hardesty that the law was well settled to include 
petroleum in a grant of “minerals” perhaps meant to refer to law in other 
states, but it appears to have overstated the certainty on that point in Ohio, 
at least as of 1928.  In particular, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in 
Detlor specifically determined that “other valuable minerals” did not 
include petroleum because the intention to include it was not made clear by 
the deed’s language in light of the circumstances.225  That holding in Detlor 
stands in stark contrast with the holding of Hardesty, which stated oil and 
gas was included in a conveyances of “minerals” unless the language 
showed an intention not to include it. 
After comparing the Gordon and Hardesty decisions, the Stocker court 
referred to Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, to note the primary split 
of authority concerning this issue: 
1.  The term “other substances of value underlying the premises” 
includes oil and gas unless other language in the instrument so 
restricts the definition of the term to exclude them. 
2.  The term “other substances of value underlying the premises” 
does not include oil and gas unless other language in the 
instrument indicates that the term has been used with the intent to 
include them.226 
Looking to Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co.227 for support, the court 
determined that Ohio cases relating to “terms of general description appear 




224. Id. at *7 (citing Hudson v. McGuire, 233 S.W. 1101, 1103 (Ky. App. 1920)). 
225. See Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692-93 (Ohio 1898). 
226. Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger, 250 N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969) (emphasis 
added). 
227. 29 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1876). 
228. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 275. 
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“[t]he words ‘reserving all the minerals underlying the soil,’ in the granting 
clause of a deed for the conveyance of real estate, constitute, prima facie, an 
exception of the minerals from the operation of the grant.”229  
Unfortunately, the question before the court in the Sloan case was not 
whether “minerals” included the oil and gas estate, but rather whether the 
term “reserving” was intended to act as a reservation or as an exception.230 
However, although not well settled at the time of Hardesty, the trend in 
Ohio may well be that the later in time a deed was executed, the more likely 
the parties intended a grant or reservation of “minerals” to include the oil 
and gas estate.  In support of this, we look to the dates of the relevant deeds 
discussed above.  The Deltor case dealt with a deed executed in 1890,231 
and the Gordon case dealt with a deed executed in 1902.232  Both of those 
cases concluded that oil and gas was not intended by the relevant language, 
partly based upon the circumstances, which suggest oil was not yet 
commonly produced.233  The Stocker opinion stated that during 1913, 
hundreds of leases had been executed and that oil had been struck on the 
land in question.234  Further, that court stated “[w]e are certain . . . that if 
one were to ask any oil and gas man or any layman to name substances of 
value underlying premises, each would give oil and gas high priority among 
the substances named.”235  For that reason, the court determined that oil and 
gas was included within the exception.236  Appreciating that Ohio courts 
look to the circumstances surrounding the particular transaction, then, may 
help explain why the Hardesty case, in interpreting a 1919 deed, found the 
law was well settled that oil and gas was intended by the term 
“minerals.”237 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it appears Ohio courts rely on the 
community knowledge and exceptional characteristics tests to determine 
what the parties intended “minerals” to include.  As the circumstance 
 
229. Id. 
230. See generally Sloan, 29 Ohio St. 568 (Ohio 1876). 
231. Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692 (Ohio 1898). 
232. Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App. 319, 319 (1924). 
233. Detlor, 49 N.E. at 692-93; Gordon, 19 Ohio App. at 322-23. 
234. Stocker, 250 N.E.2d at 274. 
235. Id. at 275.  It is unclear whether the court is referring to people as of 1969 or as of 1914, 
although from language on page 274 of the opinion, it appears the court believed this applied in 
1914, as well as at the writing of the opinion. 
236. Id. (“By the words used in the deed, the designation of substances has but two 
qualifications.  The first is that they be of value, which can only mean of such worth as to make 
feasible their removal.  The second is that they are underlying the ground.  This can leave no 
question as to oil and gas but explains why coal, which is frequently stripped from the surface, 
was separately specified.”). 
237. See generally Hardesty v. Harrison, 6 Ohio Law Abs. 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928). 
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changed and as the mineral extraction industry grew, the interpretation of 
“minerals” appears to have expanded in the absence of limiting language.  
This highlights the underlying issue that drafters using the same or very 
similar terms in deeds in Ohio may not be able to rely on static precedent in 
interpreting such language, but rather, must keep in mind the fluidity of the 
mineral extraction industry.  As technology improves and previously 
unrecoverable resources are tapped, this issue may again be broached in the 
not so distant future. 
F. PENNSYLVANIA 
In Pennsylvania, the meaning given the term “minerals” in a 
conveyance of land was initially interpreted using a community knowledge 
test.  Now, however, the meaning is well settled – so well settled, in fact, 
that Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions have referred to the 
interpretation as a “rule of property [that] will not be disturbed.”238  In the 
seminal case of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick,239 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania decided that a reservation of “all minerals” did not include 
a reservation of oil.240  The court initially admitted that a strict scientific 
interpretation of the word “minerals” necessarily includes petroleum.241  
However, all inorganic substances are technically minerals; therefore, if the 
reservation was intended to be as broad as the scientific definition of 
“minerals,” it would be as broad as the grant and therefore void.242  For that 
reason, it was necessary to limit the meaning. 
The method for limiting the definition of minerals used in Dunham is 
as followed:  “[t]he best construction is that which is made by viewing the 
subject of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for . . . it may 
be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves 
viewed it.”243  The opinion noted that most people considered substances of 
a metallic nature to be minerals.244  “Certainly, in popular estimation 
petroleum is not regarded as a mineral substance any more than is animal or 
vegetable oil, and it can, indeed, only be so classified in the most general or 
scientific sense.”245  With the foregoing in mind, the court concluded that 
 
238. Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398 (Pa. 1960) (quoting Preston v. South 
Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1913)). 
239. 101 Pa. 36 (1882). 
240. Dunham, 101 Pa. at 44. 
241. Id. at 43. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. (citation omitted).  Note the court’s resort to the community knowledge test. 
244. Id. at 44. 
245. Id. 
          
2012] CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 685 
parties surely intended the word to take on its popular understanding and 
that they probably were not even aware that the property was underlain by 
petroleum.246  Further, if the parties had intended to reserve the petroleum 
oil, the court stated that they should have expressly done so in clear 
terms.247 
A quarter of a century later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up 
an almost identical question:  did the reservation of mineral rights include 
natural gas?  In Silver v. Bush,248 the conveyance was of certain “pieces or 
parcels of land . . . together with all and singular the . . . hereditaments and 
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, 
and the reversions and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof; and all 
the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim and demand whatsoever, of 
the [grantor].”249  The habendum clause read “to have and to hold the said 
piece or parcel of land except the minerals underlying the same and the 
right of way to and from said mineral which the first parties reserve.”250 
The court in Silver went through much the same analysis as in 
Dunham, such as stating that the meaning of minerals must be limited so 
that the reservation will not fail for overbreadth.251  It noted that the word, 
as has previously been mentioned, has both a very broad scientific meaning, 
but also a presumptive “commercial” usage in the context of a real property 
conveyance.252  In the commercial sense, the term “minerals” can mean 
“any inorganic substance found in nature having sufficient value separated 
from its situs as part of the earth to be mined, quarried or dug for its own 
sake or its own specific uses.”253  A given substance may or may not, then, 
fit within this commercial meaning of “mineral,” depending upon “the 
circumstances and the intent of the parties.”254 
At that point, the court recited the Dunham rule, that petroleum was not 
included in a reservation of “minerals,” which consequently takes natural 
gas out of the scope of the word.255  The court noted, parties may avoid 
operation of the Dunham rule by clear and convincing evidence that the 




248. 62 A. 832 (Pa. 1906). 
249. Silver, 62 A. at 832-33. 




254. Id.  This sounds like a type of exceptional-characteristics test. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 833-34. 
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that at the time the deed was executed, the land was already being 
developed for natural gas and it was known that such gas was a “marketable 
commodity.”257  This evidence was deemed insufficient to overcome the 
burden to remove the case from the Dunham rule, and the court again stated 
that “if the parties intended to include gas they would have said so 
expressly.”258 
After Silver, the Dunham rule has resurfaced several times.  In 1913, 
the court decided Preston v. South Penn Oil Co.,259 which held that oil and 
gas was not included in a reservation of minerals, noting that “Dunham v. 
Kirkpatrick has been the law of this State for thirty years . . . and it will not 
be disturbed.”260  In the 1953 case of Bundy v. Myers,261 the court held a 
reservation of “oil” along with “coal, fire clay and minerals” to exclude 
natural gas.262  The defendant assignees in that case asserted the rule of 
ejusdem generis to conclude that the reservation of oil included natural gas, 
as gas was as much a mineral as the oil, which was expressly reserved.263  
The court countered that if gas was intended to be included, why was only 
oil expressly reserved?264 
As shown in the above discussion, from time to time the Dunham rule 
has been challenged.  The resulting cases, including Silver and Bundy, have 
acknowledged that some Pennsylvania cases have defined oil and gas as 
minerals.265  Indeed, one case interpreted a lease for “mines and minerals,” 
by stating the term “‘[m]inerals’ embraces everything, not of the mere 
surface, which is used for agricultural purposes . . . .”266  That same 
discussion is likewise taken up in a more recent case.  In Highland v. 
Commonwealth,267 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that a 
 
257. Id. at 834. 
258. Id. 
259. 86 A. 203 (Pa. 1913). 
260. Preston, 86 A. at 204. 
261. Bundy v. Myers, 94 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1953). 
262. Bundy, 94 A.2d at 725-26. 
263. Id. at 726. 
264. Id.  Note that it is difficult to square this with the court’s language in Silver:  “It was 
held, therefore, that petroleum was not within the intent of the parties in reserving the minerals.  
And, a fortiori, natural gas would not be so included.”  Silver, 62 A. at 833.  “Petroleum” in Silver 
apparently referred exclusively to “oil,” because the word is used in reference to the Dunham 
decision, which covered petroleum oil, and the Silver opinion distinguished the two substances by 
saying, e.g., that some cases have decided that “petroleum and gas” are minerals. 
265. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Dewitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) (“Gas, it is true is a 
mineral, but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes . . . .”); Gill v. Weston, 1 A. 921, 923 (Pa. 
1885) (“[Petroleum] is a mineral substance obtained from the earth by a process of mining . . . .”); 
Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 201 (1879) (“Oil, however, is a mineral, and being a mineral is 
part of the realty.”). 
266. Griffin v. Fellows, 81 Pa. 114, 124 (Pa. 1873). 
267. 161 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1960). 
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number of decisions cited have included petroleum and natural gas within 
the definition of “minerals,” but also that “it has been held that in other 
connections they are not included under that term.”268  In accounting for the 
difference, the court stated that “[t]he variations in the scope of the word 
arise from the connection and application in which it is used.”269  The 
primary question is “what was the sense in which the parties used the 
word?”270  Although general interpretation is that it does not include oil and 
gas, the parties may offer clear and convincing evidence that they “so 
understood or intended the word, “mineral” or even that it had acquired a 
usage in conveyancing which would include [those terms].”271  In the 
Highland case, seven deeds were at issue, two of which, it was averred, 
conveyed the natural gas rights by the terms “other minerals” as interpreted 
in light of the surrounding circumstances and by later events.272  The court 
specifically referenced a host of factors in finding the “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden was not overcome, among them that the mining of coal 
was the principal objective of the conveyances, and that the deeds made no 
express reference to natural gas as provided in others executed 
simultaneously therewith.273 
From the foregoing discussion, we see that Pennsylvania courts do not 
wholly dismiss the idea that the term “minerals” as used in a deed could be 
construed as including oil and natural gas.  However, the default position 
has been to hold that oil and gas are not included without a showing by 
clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended otherwise.  To date, 
the burden has proved so difficult to overcome that the only way to ensure a 
successful conveyance of those substances is by expressly referencing 
them.274 
Because of the settled nature of this law, Pennsylvania courts have not 
relied heavily on canons of construction.  In a more recent case, however, a 
new aspect of the Dunham rule was considered, and the court referenced 
multiple canons in its opinion.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate275 
 




272. Id. at 393-98. 
273. Id. at 399-400 (finding the above factors respectively bolstered by an absence of oil or 
gas exploration on the relevant tracts, as well as “a high degree of selectivity and precision of 
language” in drafting the contrasting deed descriptions). 
274. See, e.g., New Shawmut Mining Co., v. Gordon, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 477, 482 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1963) (noting that the words “boring for” and “crude” do not provide clear and 
convincing evidence that oil and gas was intended, as they have applicability in coal operations, as 
well). 
275. 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
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addressed whether the Dunham rule works to construe the term “mineral” 
as including unconventional Marcellus shale gas.  The appellants argued 
that shale gas should be included, based upon the following rationale: the 
deed at issue was written before the Dunham decision, which resulted in 
what they claimed to be a “depart[ure] from past precedent”276; and the 
Dunham and Highland decisions are distinguishable from the present case, 
because they dealt with conventional gas which was in the nature of ferae 
naturae, or “free flowing ‘wild’ gas,” not unconventional Marcellus shale 
gas.277  The nature of Marcellus gas makes a difference, appellants asserted, 
because it is deposited in a dense rock formation and requires hydraulic 
fracturing to produce.278  Because of this distinction, they relied on U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Hoge279 to support their position of “whoever owns the shale, 
owns the gas.”280 
The Butler court stated that when interpreting a deed, the following 
canons apply: 
[A] court’s primary object must be to ascertain and effectuate what 
the parties themselves intended.  The traditional rules of 
construction to determine that intention involve the following 
principles.  First, the nature and quantity of the interest conveyed 
must be ascertained from the deed itself and cannot be orally 
shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake.  We seek to 
ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the language 
but what is the meaning of the words they used.  Effect must be 
given to all the language of the instrument, and no part shall be 
rejected if it can be given a meaning.  If a doubt arises concerning 
the interpretation of the instrument, it will be resolved against the 
party who prepared it.  To ascertain the intention of the parties, the 
language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of the subject 
matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the 
conditions existing when it was executed.281 
 
276. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983). 
280. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40 (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383-84 
(Pa. 1983)), see also United States Steel Corp., 468 A.2d at 1383-84 (“[A]s a general rule, 
subterranean gas is owned by whoever has title to the property in which the gas is resting. . . .  
Although coalbed gas contained in coal is, ab initio, property of the coal owner, that owner may 
allow others certain rights respecting the gas.”). 
281. Butler, 29 A.3d at 40 (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318 (Pa. 
Super. 2005)); see Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103, 107 n.6 (Pa. 1957), for 
the following additional note on deed construction: 
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This language appears to require that the court determines the parties intent 
not by what they subjectively intended their words to mean.  Rather, it must 
look to the objective meaning the language should be given “in the light of 
the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the 
conditions existing when it was executed.” 
Yet, the court did not engage in an analysis of the foregoing canons.  
Instead, it continued by noting the specialized construction of the term 
“minerals” as used in a deed based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
precedent previously discussed herein.282  Interestingly, however, it 
overturned the trial court’s decision that Dunham is controlling.283  Instead, 
it remanded for further proceedings so the parties can consult appropriate 
experts relating to:  (1) whether Marcellus shale itself is a “mineral”; (2) 
whether the gas contained therein is a conventional gas of the nature 
contemplated in Dunham and Highland; and (3) whether the Marcellus 
shale is similar in nature to coal to the extent that whoever owns the shale 
owns the gas.284  The appellees, who claim the shale gas is not within the 
definition of mineral, have appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
which appeal was granted.285  Thus, even now this “well settled” law is in 
flux, and we may see a landmark decision in the coming months. 
G. WEST VIRGINIA 
With its long history of oil and gas jurisprudence, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals has addressed the precise issue of which 
substances are properly included in a grant or reservation of “minerals.”  
For example, early cases held that a reservation of “the right to all minerals 
in and under . . . the land” included oil and gas.286  More recently, the West 
 
In interpreting this instrument certain rules of construction are applicable:  (1) the 
nature and quantity of the interest conveyed must be ascertained from the instrument 
itself and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake and we 
seek to ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the language but what is 
the meaning of the words . . .; (2) effect must be given to all the language of the 
instrument and no part shall be rejected if it can be given a meaning . . .; (3) if a doubt 
arises concerning the interpretation of the instrument it will be resolved against the 
party who prepared it . . .; (4) unless contrary to the plain meaning of the instrument, 
an interpretation given it by the parties themselves will be favored . . .; (5) to ascertain 
the intention of the parties, the language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of 
the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the conditions 
existing when it was executed . . . . 
(internal quotations marks omitted) (citations omitted); see also Hess v. Jones, 7 A.2d 299, 300-01 
(Pa. 1939) (setting out guidelines for the construction of written instruments). 
282. Butler, 29 A.3d at 41-42. 
283. Id. at 43. 
284. Id. 
285. See generally Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012). 
286. See Sult v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E. 307, 308 (W. Va. 1908). 
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Virginia high court offered the following summary of the state’s precedent 
with respect to deed reservations in general.287 
First, the court must “place itself in the situation of the parties, as near 
as may be, to determine the meaning and intent of the language employed 
in the deed.”  Where applicable, “reservations are strictly construed against 
a grantor and in favor of a grantee” as to whether the language creates an 
ambiguity.288  If a deed is “unambiguous there is no need for construction 
and it is the duty of the court to give to every word its usual 
meaning . . . [and] will endeavor to carry into effect the intent of the parties 
to the agreement, seeking first to ascertain such intent from the instrument 
itself.”289  To discern that intent from the instrument, the court will afford 
the language “its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to judicial 
construction.”290  Rather, the parties will be bound to the “general and 
ordinary meanings of words used in deeds.”291  Nonetheless, “[a]s a general 
rule, ambiguities in a deed are to be clarified by resort to the intention of the 
parties ascertained from the deed itself, the circumstances surrounding its 
execution, as well as the subject matter and the parties’ situation at that 
time.”292 
The court most recently addressed the scope of “other minerals” in 
West Virginia Department of Highways v. Farmer, where it considered the 
single question of whether sand and gravel under and upon a surface 
owner’s parcel “is included in a reservation of the ‘oil, gas and other 
minerals.’”293  Eventually ruling in the negative, the court’s opinion in 
Farmer exemplifies the state’s rather confused line of cases regarding the 
application of canons of construction to oil and gas instruments.294  As in all 
cases resting on canons to resolve facial ambiguity, the factual context in 
Farmer is crucial to understanding the court’s logic.  Farmer, who acquired 
the subject surface acreage long after severance, was compensated by jury 
award at eminent domain proceedings after the state highway agency 
removed sand and gravel from his land for use in road construction.295  
Parties owning the rights to “all oil and gas and other minerals” under 
 
287. See generally Meadows v. Belknap, 483 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1997). 
288. See id. at 829. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 829-30. 
291. See id. at 830. 
292. Id. at 829 (citing Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Co., 107 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1959); 
Oresta v. Romano Brothers, Inc., 73 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1952); Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 
118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)). 
293. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719. 
294. See, e.g., Toothman v. Courtney, 58 S.E. 915, 918 (W. Va. 1907). 
295. See Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719. 
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Farmer’s tract intervened seeking their respective 9/10ths interest in this 
award.296  Thus, the posture of the case before the Supreme Court of 
Appeals was whether sand and gravel remained with the burdened surface 
estate or passed to mineral owners by virtue of the language “other 
minerals.” 
In considering whether the term “minerals” created ambiguity in the 
deed, the court acknowledged West Virginia precedent provided a broad 
plain meaning approach that typically includes sand and gravel as 
minerals.297  As held in Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co.,298 “[t]he 
word ‘mineral’ in its ordinary and common meaning is a comprehensive 
term including every description of stone and rock deposit, whether 
containing metallic or nonmetallic substances.”299  The court then noted that 
“where language in a deed is unambiguous there is no need for construction 
and it is the duty of the court to give to every word its usual meaning.”300  
In the alternative, “where an ambiguity is introduced by the restrictive 
language, making unclear the intention of the grantors in reserving minerals 
from a conveyance, construction of the language is in order and the 
surrounding circumstances and actions of the parties may be considered.”301 
The court found the deed ambiguous based on the language itself, 
which “did not specifically reserve the sand and gravel,” and the 
“surrounding circumstances and past activities concerning this property.”302  
These surrounding circumstances relevant to the court included evidence 
that when the deed was executed, sand and gravel were not sold from the 
land or in the area, and that Farmer knew of the sand when he purchased the 
land for farming purposes.303  Thus finding the plain meaning definition in 
Waugh inapplicable, the court explained that “accepted rules of 
construction must be employed” to resolve the ambiguous intent of the 
original grantor.304 
Relying on a seemingly random set of canons, the court proceeded to 
discuss various construction tactics in a troublingly unclear fashion.  First, 
the court applied ejusdem generis, explaining that canon provides:  “where 
 
296. See id. 
297. See id. 
298. 137 S.E. 895 (W. Va. 1927). 
299. See Waugh, 137 S.E. at 897; see also Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 129 S.E. 
311, 312 (W. Va. 1925); Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162, 163 (W. Va. 1923); Horse 
Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (W. Va. 1918). 
300. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 71 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 
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general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general 
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as 
applying only to persons or things of the same kind, class or nature as those 
specifically mentioned.”305  In ruling that ejusdem generis would exclude 
sand and gravel from the class created by “oil and gas in and under,” the 
court simply concluded that such language connotes only petroleum 
products and nothing more: 
Applying this doctrine to the language of the reservation in the 
instant case, the enumeration of oil and gas makes meaningless the 
term ‘other minerals,’ except for minerals which are of the same 
kind, class or nature, that is, petroleum products.  A grant or 
reservation of specifically named minerals conveys and reserves 
rights only in those minerals.  Under this doctrine, then, sand and 
gravel are excluded from the reservation.306 
The next canon considered by the court was contra proferentum – 
“where an ambiguity exists in an instrument, the language will be construed 
against the grantor.”307  The court did not cite to a wealth of precedent 
related to mineral deed construction and this canon, but rather noted that 
“[r]estrictive covenants are to be strictly construed against the person 
seeking to enforce them, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of natural 
rights and a free use of property, and against restrictions.”308  Without 
making conclusions in this regard, the court observed that in this case “the 
[mineral owners] seek to include sand and gravel in the reservation [while] 
the Farmers seek a free use of their property.”309  However, the actual 
circumstances of this case concerned compensation for property taken by 
eminent domain – unfortunately the court did not clarify how either party to 
the title dispute could garner support from a specified ‘free use’ policy 
under these facts. 
The court continued this superficial analysis, next with reference to a 
similar cases that excluded sand and gravel from the phrase “and other 
minerals” because these materials “had no rare character or value and 
 
305. Id. at 719-20 (citing Bischoff v. Francesa, 56 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1949); Neekamp v. 
Huntington Chamber of Commerce, 129 S.E. 314 (W. Va. 1925); Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
91 S.E. 391 (W. Va. 1917)). 
306. See id. at 720 (citing Prindle v. Baker, 178 S.E. 513 (W. Va. 1935); Ramage v. South 
Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)). 
307. Id.  This is but one example of the somewhat unclear variation of this ‘construe against 
the drafter’ canon as ‘against the grantor.’ 
308. Id. (quoting Neekamp v. Huntington Chamber of Comm., 129 S.E. 314 (W. Va. 1925)). 
309. Id. at 720-21. 
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[were] useful only in road building . . . .”310  Without expounding on this 
reference to ‘rare value’ found in other states, the court then focused on 
prior use and held: 
Farmer purchased [and used] the subject land for the purpose of 
engaging in farming . . . .  No owner of the minerals in the past had 
ever attempted to exercise any control whatsoever over the sand 
and gravel.  It is readily discernible that the reservation of the 
minerals created in 1911, did not intend to include sand and 
gravel.  Were it otherwise, the sand and gravel which lay 
principally on the surface, could be taken by the owners of the 
minerals and the surface owners could be deprived entirely of the 
use of such surface.  The conveyance to the Farmers would be 
useless.311 
To wrap up its analysis with a final bit of opacity, the court concluded that 
the above reasoning “was the opinion of the courts in Colorado, Texas, and 
Louisiana” in Farrell v. Sayre,312 Acker v. Guinn,313 and Holloway Gravel 
Co. v. McKowen,314 respectively.  Interestingly, Farrell ultimately applies a 
‘community knowledge’ test to its holding, while Acker and McKowen are 
touchstone surface destruction cases;315 however, neither canon was 
specifically mentioned in Farmer.  Nonetheless, based on these 
circumstances, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found sand 
and gravel excluded from the reservation.316 
H. TENNESSEE 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has had occasion to address the 
question, “what substances are included in a grant or reservation of 
‘minerals.’”  In Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co.,317 the 
court adopted a version of the rule of practical construction in its approach 
to such disputes.318  In that case, a reservation of “all the mines or minerals 
 
310. Id. (citing Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973); Elkhorn City Land Co. v. 
Elkhorn City, 459 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1970); Hwy Comm’n v. Trujillo, 487 P.2d 122 (N.M. 1971)). 
311. Id. 
312. 270 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1954). 
313. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). 
314. 9 So. 2d 228 (La. 1942). 
315. The Farmer court itself quotes Acker for the proposition that a substance will not be 
severed under a grant or reservation of “minerals” if it “must be removed by methods that will, in 
effect, consume or deplete the surface estate.”  Id. at 720-21 (citing Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 
348 (Tex. 1971)). 
316. See id. at 828. 
317. 265 S.W. 674 (Tenn. 1924). 
318. Campbell, 265 S.W. at 678. 
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contained or imbedded in or on said tract” was reserved unto grantor.319  
Grantor’s successor in interest, the defendant in the case, contended that 
said reservation included limestone.320 
While the crux of the court’s construction targeted the reservation 
language as written, it explained the scope of its interpretive focus as a 
broader consideration of the parties’ overall intent, which can be 
ascertained only when considering the surrounding circumstances of the 
conveyance.  The court affords notable weight to the unambiguous intent of 
the grantor.  However, if the grantor’s intent remains unclear, the court will 
resolve such ambiguities in the agreement against him and in the grantee’s 
favor.321  Thus, the court limits its focus to the nature of the grantor-grantee 
relationship and the dealings between them rather than “arbitrary definitions 
in reference to mineral substances buried in the earth.”322 
The court began by interpreting the language used and cited by 
numerous commentators on the meaning of “mines” and “minerals.”  
Several cases and other authorities drew a distinction between a “mine,” 
which is a location where the subsurface is excavated without breaking the 
surface, and a “quarry,” which is the opening of the surface to remove a 
material.323  The court also recognized that the term “mineral” is susceptible 
to multiple definitions based upon its context.324  Specifically, if given a 
broad definition, the term might embrace even the soil; if restricted to 
precious metals, it would be limited too significantly; if distinguished from 
the agricultural part of the land, it would be unhelpful in desert or rocky 
lands not suitable for agricultural purposes.325 
The court also looked to the circumstances of the case to find that 
limestone was deposited along bluffs and along the surface throughout the 
property in issue and that at the time of the reservation limestone had no 
commercial value.326  For the reservation to be construed to include the 
limestone, it would destroy the conveyance, because quarrying that 
substance would destroy the whole surface.327  Therefore, it should be 
obvious that the parties did not intend limestone to be included; if they did, 
they would have explicitly included it in the reservation.328 
 
319. Id. at 674. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 676. 
322. Id. at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
323. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
324. Id. at 677-78. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 676. 
327. Id.  Note use of the surface destruction test. 
328. Id. 
          
2012] CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 695 
As recently as 2011, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the 
need to resort to a practical construction of a deed when answering a similar 
question.  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee filed 
a certification order before the high court seeking an answer to whether a 
1928 mineral reservation included sandstone.329  The court stated that the 
question was not purely a matter of law but required analysis of relevant 
facts.  Indeed “the term ‘mineral’ is ambiguous,” and “each case requiring 
its construction ‘must be determined upon its peculiar facts, giving due 
consideration to the intention of the parties.”330 
I. VIRGINIA 
Virginia case law shows that courts in that state are intent upon finding 
the most reasonable interpretation, in each case, based upon the intent of the 
parties at the time the instrument was executed.  As early as 1903, the 
Virginia Supreme Court in White v. Sayers331 applied “well-settled rules of 
construction” to determine whether a contract establishing a partnership to 
explore for “minerals” which might be found in paying quantities 
effectively conveyed ownership of coal.  The principles that guided the 
court were as follows: 
Regard should be had to the intention of the parties, and such 
intention should be given effect.  To arrive at this intention, regard 
is to be had to the situation of the parties, the subject matter of the 
agreement, the object which the parties had in view at the time and 
intended to accomplish.  A construction should be avoided, if it 
can be done consistently with the tenor of the agreement, which 
would be unreasonable or unequal, and that construction which is 
most obviously just is to be favored as most in accordance with the 
presumed intention of the parties.332 
The best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject 
of the contract as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may be 
 
329. Heineman v. Terra Enters., LLC, No. M2011-00559-SC-R23-CQ, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 
531, at *1 (Tenn. May 27, 2011). 
330. Id. (citing Campbell Tenn. Coal Iron & R.R. Co., 265 S.W. 674, 677 (Tenn. 1924); 
State v. Lahiere-Hill, LLC, 278 S.W.3d 745, 749-52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).  But see Murray v. 
Allred, 43 S.W. 355, 359-60 (Tenn. 1897) (considering a description of the substances at issue to 
determine that oil and gas are both minerals falling within the reservation of “all mines, minerals, 
and metals under the land” and appearing not to factor into that decision any relevant 
circumstances other than the fact that the “bulk of mankind” would likely also include those 
substances within the reservation). 
331. 45 S.E. 747 (Va. 1903). 
332. White, 45 S.E. at 749 (quoting Shen. L., &c. Co. v. Hise, 23 S.E. 303, 304 (Va. 1895)) 
(emphasis added).  Note that this, along with the subsequent two guidelines, are essentially the 
practical construction test. 
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safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties 
themselves viewed it.333 
In the construction of a contract the whole instrument is to be 
considered; not any one provision only, but all its provisions; not 
the words merely in which they were expressed, but their object 
and purpose, as disclosed by the language, by the subject matter, 
and the condition and relation of the parties.334 
The court applied these principles to determine that the agreement was 
more in the nature of a partnership agreement than a mineral conveyance.  
Therefore, the parties were free to end the partnership by mutual 
agreement.335  Furthermore, at the time the contract was entered into, coal 
had no value, and that was the case for more than forty years.  Rather, at 
that time, gold was the mineral causing great excitement in the area.  In 
fact, it was only a few years before the action was instituted that coal gained 
any appreciable value.  Based on these facts, the court determined that the 
term “minerals” was not intended to include coal in that case.336 
Since the White case, Virginia has not waivered from this interpretation 
of the question “what does the term ‘minerals’ include?”  In 1928, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia determined that a reservation of “metals and 
minerals” did not include limestone.337  Stating that the decision should 
always turn on the language at issue, the surrounding circumstances, and 
the grantor’s intent, if known, the court considered various pieces of 
evidence.338  The factor that appeared to be the most significant was that the 
surface of most land in the area was comprised of limestone:  “In this 
limestone country, where a grant of land is made, and the minerals and right 
to remove them are reserved, the language ought to be clear and specific to 
justify a construction that would allow the reservation to take back or 
destroy the thing that is granted.”339  Therefore, the court construed the 
reservation as not intending to include limestone.340  This same reasoning 
was again applied in 1966, when the court decided that “minerals” did not 
include sand and gravel, because, although technically minerals, those 
substances made up the whole surface.341 
 
333. Id. (quoting Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore, 2 Whart. 477, 491 (Pa. 1837)). 
334. Id. (quoting Millan v. Kephart, 18 Gratt. 1, 10 (Va. 1867)). 
335. Id. at 748. 
336. Id.  Note reliance on a version of the exceptional characteristics test. 
337. Beury v. Shelton, 144 S.E. 629, 633 (Va. 1928). 
338. Id. at 632. 
339. Id. at 633. 
340. Id. 
341. Shores v. Shaffer, 146 S.E.2d 190, 193-94 (Va. 1966). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The current situation facing the oil and gas industry as various parties 
attempt to settle mineral ownership disputes is a type of litigation paradox.  
In most jurisdictions (other than those that have set by statute or by 
definitive precedent the interpretation to be given to language in a deed), 
the only way to achieve predictability and settled precedent is through 
continued litigation.  However, the most significant practical goal of 
drafting these instruments is to unambiguously detail the parties’ rights and 
thereby avoid litigation.  Another consideration adding to the complexity of 
this issue is an understanding that one weak link in the chain of title can 
affect ownership, despite the parties’ present attempts to limit ambiguity in 
their drafting.  Unfortunately, no clear solution exists for correcting the 
problems that result from inconsistent application of canons of construction.  
Instead, courts should determine which policy consideration is more 
important, free will to contract or predictability, and apply canons more 
consistently. 
Whether it is desirable, or even feasible, to have a uniform definition of 
the term “minerals” in this context, is certainly a decision to be made on a 
state-by-state basis.  For some states, ascertaining the intent of the parties is 
a weightier policy consideration.  In those states, determinations are always 
made on a case-by-case basis to determine what the original parties to the 
particular contract intended.342  Such an approach, at first blush, may appear 
to be more equitable.  However, the search for intent often becomes more 
about the application of canons of construction; in that situation, who can 
say that the meaning finally determined to be the parties’ “intent” was what 
those individuals had in mind when executing the deed decades ago?343 
This approach stands in stark contrast to that taken in other states, 
which favor an established rule of law for reliably determining mineral 
ownership.  North Dakota, for example, has statutorily set the interpretation 
 
342. See, e.g., Heineman v. Terra Enters., LLC, No. M2011-00559-SC-R23-CQ, 2011 Tenn. 
LEXIS 531, at *1 (Tenn. May 27, 2011) (“Each case involving the interpretation of a contract or 
deed that grants or reserves mineral rights ‘must be decided upon the language of the grant or 
reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the grantor, if it can be 
ascertained.  The adoption of arbitrary definitions in reference to mineral substances buried in the 
earth is not permissible.’” (quoting Campbell v. Tenn. Coal. Iron & R.R. Co., 265 S.W. 674, 677 
(Tenn. 1924))). 
343. See, e.g., McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 353 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“It 
seems highly unrealistic to attempt to determine, at a later date, whether, in an early conveyance, 
the parties intended to include or to exclude oil and gas from their usage of the term “minerals,” 
where such intent is purportedly determined by reference to ‘facts and circumstances then 
existing’ and of which adequate proof has long since vanished.  All too often this ‘intent,’ as 
determined, results from application of the rules of evidence concerning burden of proof and 
presumptions, which have little relevance to the actual intent of the parties.” (omitting internal 
reference)). 
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to be given to the term “mineral” as used in a conveyance of real estate,344 
although the definition is not applicable to instruments executed prior to the 
enactment of the statute.345  Other states have determined through case law 
that the term “other minerals” unambiguously includes “oil and gas” and 
that extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to show otherwise.346  The 
outcome in these states will obviously at times conflict with the original 
parties’ intent and can be viewed as obstructing the free will to contract.  
However, the predictability afforded to title examiners and property owners, 
especially for the purpose of securing the capital needed for mineral 
development, may be deemed to outweigh any detriment to intent. 
For the foregoing reasons, courts must more carefully apply canons of 
construction.  First, they should understand that canons are intended to 
apply to situations when intent cannot otherwise be found on the face of a 
written instrument.  It is when the language is evenly predisposed to 
multiple interpretations that canons may be used to shift the scales in favor 
of one over the others.  For example, a court may apply the doctrine of 
contra proferentum to favor the equally plausible interpretation that most 
benefits the party who did not select the document’s language.  Further, 
courts must more clearly state the factors they consider when deciding 
which specific canons to apply;347 what, if any, extrinsic evidence is 
appropriate for consideration in specific contexts; and what effect this 
precedent should have on other similarly drafted documents.348  Only 
through this clarity can title examiners and averred owners find comfort in 
opinions relating to title ownership. 
 
344. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24, -25 (2011). 
345. See McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 393 (N.D. 1980). 
346. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1984); McCormick, 14 P.3d at 353-54 (“Allowing the introduction of extrinsic evidence many 
decades after the deed conveyances . . . invites uncertainty and litigation . . . .  [W]e hold that a 
deed reservation for ‘other minerals’ reserves oil and gas . . . .  We treat this matter as one of 
property law and determine that precedent forecloses the question . . . for trial.”); Miller Land & 
Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Wyo. 1988) (“We hold that the 
mineral reservation ‘reserving unto Grantor, all minerals and mineral rights existing under 
said . . . lands’ expresses a clear and unambiguous intent by the grantor to reserve all the minerals, 
whatever they may be.”). 
347. Although not technically binding, such guidance would be useful to future courts and 
for parties attempting to ascertain mineral ownership. 
348. For example, will a decision that a reservation of “oil, gas, and other minerals” includes 
coal apply to a document that reserves “all minerals;” would this decision be different if a 
similarly-worded instrument was executed under different circumstances, at a different period of 
time, in a different area; etc.? 
